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SUBMARINE CABLES, CYBERSECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS
Tara Davenport *

The international community’s ever-increasing reliance on the Internet and
web-based information and communications technologies (“ICT”) has meant
that cybersecurity is becoming one of the most pressing concerns in the 21st
century. The International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) 1 has defined
cybersecurity to mean “the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber
environment and organization and user’s assets.” 2 The Distributed Denial of
Service attacks against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively
where coordinated botnets overwhelmed servers and shut down the Internet; 3
the disruption of the operation of centrifuges at an Iran nuclear facility by the
Stuxnet worm in 2010;4 the sustained State-sponsored cyber-hacking program
in China; 5 and the discovery that national security agencies in the West have
been carrying out mass surveillance of virtual communications for years have
*

LLB, London School of Economics, 2002; LLM (Maritime Law), National University of
Singapore, 2010; LLM, Yale Law School, 2014; Lecturer, National University of Singapore; Research Fellow, Centre of International Law, National University of Singapore;
J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2017.
1
The International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) is the leading U.N. agency that
establishes international standards for information and communication technology. See
About ITU, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/about (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
2
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, REC. ITU-T X.1205, SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN
SYSTEM
COMMUNICATIONS
AND
SECURITY
2
(2008),
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/ITU-080418-RecomOverviewOfCS.pdf.
3
Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 837-38
(2012).
4
Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon,
WIRED (Nov. 3, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-daystuxnet/.
5
David Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2011 at A11.
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elevated cybersecurity to the forefront of global attention. 6
The discussions on cybersecurity in international policy and academic circles have focused primarily on how to protect the information that exists in
cyberspace. 7 A glaring omission from this discussion is the security of the
physical infrastructure that underpins the virtual cloud of cyberspace, namely
the security of the submarine fiber optic network. These submarine communication cables—which are hidden from plain view—form a vast network on the
seabed, are often no bigger than a garden hose, and transmit massive amounts
of data across oceans. 8 They provide over 95% of international telecommunications—not via satellites as is commonly assumed. 9 The global submarine
network is the “backbone” of the Internet, and enables the ubiquitous use of email, social media, phone and banking services; 10 goods and services we now
take for granted. As technology develops, uses for submarine fiber optic cables
continue to evolve, and their utility goes beyond the mere transmission of data—these cables are now extensively relied upon by the military, the oil and
gas industry, as well as the scientific community.
Notwithstanding their status as critical communications infrastructure, submarine cable systems remain vulnerable to a variety of emerging cybersecurity
challenges. First, since September 11th, there has been a growing concern about
submarine cable systems as targets—specifically, the possibility of what will
be broadly described as intentional interference with submarine cable systems
by State and/or non-State actors. 11 This includes intentional damage to subma6
Ewen MacAskill et al., NSA Files: Decoded – What the Revelations Mean for You,
THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter MacAskill et al., NSA Files],
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillancerevelations-decoded#section/1.
7
See generally Press Release, The White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Securing
Cyberspace: President Obama Announces New Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal and
Other Cybersecurity Efforts (Jan. 13, 2015) (on file with author); Cheryl Pellerin, Defense,
Intel Leaders: Cybersecurity Priorities Are Defense, Deterrence, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept.
29,
2015),
http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/621018/defense-intelleaders-cybersecurity-priorities-are-defense-deterrence.
8
Christopher Intagliata & Marlisse Silver Sweeney, What Links the Global Internet?
Wires Inside Tubes No Bigger Than a Garden Hose, PRI (Apr. 20, 2015. 8:00 AM),
http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-04-20/what-links-global-internet-wires-inside-tubes-nobigger-garden-hose; Victoria Woollaston, Messages From the Deep: Interactive Map Plots
the Sprawling Growth of the Submarine Cable Network Since 1989, DAILY MAIL (July 24,
2014, 2:37 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2692774/Messages-deepInteractive-map-plots-sprawling-growth-submarine-cable-network-1989.html.
9
LIONEL CARTER ET AL., SUBMARINE CABLES AND THE OCEANS: CONNECTING THE
WORLD 8 (2009), http://www.iscpc.org/publications/ICPC-UNEP_Report.pdf.
10 Tara Davenport, Submarine Communications Cables and Science: A New Frontier in
Ocean Governance?, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND NEW CHALLENGES TO OCEAN LAW 209,
209 (Harry N. Schreiber et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Davenport, A New Frontier].
11 Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables From Intentional Damage–The Secu-
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rine cables laid on the seabed, cable landing stations, as well as attacks against
the virtual or cyber aspect of submarine cable systems when perpetrators hack
into the network management systems used to operate cable systems. 12
Second, submarine cables can also be used as tools in cyber-espionage and
intelligence gathering. 13 The recent startling disclosure by Edward Snowden
that, for instance, the United States and the United Kingdom have engaged in
the “the largest programme [sic] of suspicionless surveillance in human history” 14 by “tapping directly into the Internet backbone,” 15 namely the fiber optic
cables, has catapulted this issue to the forefront of global discourse.
As such, this Article will examine the relationship between submarine cables and cybersecurity in the context of these two challenges. Specifically, it
will examine the applicable international law that could potentially address
these two challenges and whether the current legal regimes are adequate in
ensuring the security of the vast network of cables that cross the ocean floor,
and thus the security of the world’s telecommunications systems.
Part I will provide background on the development of submarine communications cables, its importance, and how the industry works. Part II will discuss
the prevailing regime governing submarine cables as set out in the 1982 United
Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Law of the Sea. Part III will examine the
first threat to cybersecurity, namely intentional interference with submarine
cable systems while Part IV will explore how submarine cables have been used
as tools in cyber-espionage. Part V will set out some recommendations on what
can be done to enhance the security of the submarine cable network.

rity Gap, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 281, 281 (Douglas R.
Burnett, et al., eds. 2014) [hereinafter Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables]; see generally David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close, N.Y
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presencenear-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html?_r=1 (“Russian submarines and spy ships are aggressively operating near the vital undersea cables that carry almost all global Internet
communications, raising concerns among some American military and intelligence officials
that the Russians might be planning to attack those lines in times of tension or conflict.”).
12 Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables, supra note 11, at 283.
13 Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping, THE
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/thecreepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/.
14 Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ Taps Fibre-optic Cables For Secret Access to World’s
Communications, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013, 12:23 PM) [hereinafter MacAskill et al.,
GHCQ],
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-worldcommunications-nsa.
15 Jon Street, Wikimedia Among Nine Groups Suing the NSA for ‘Tapping Directly Into
(Mar.
10,
2015,
10:55
PM),
the
Internet
Backbone’,
THE BLAZE
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/03/10/wikimedia-among-nine-groups-suing-the-nsafor-tapping-directly-into-the-internet-backbone/.
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I. SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS CABLES: A PRIMER
A. Development
There are two main types of submarine cables: submarine communications
cables used to transmit data communications 16 and submarine power cables
used to transmit electrical power from one location to another. 17 Both are designed for underwater use and are typically laid on or buried within the seabed. 18 These submarine communications cables are the basis of this Article and
its discussion.
The genesis of submarine cables can be traced to the early part of the 19th
century and the development of the electric cable that used electricity to transmit and receive information over significant distances. 19 In 1850, the first submarine telegraph cable, consisting of copper wires and gutta percha—a type of
naturally produced latex—was laid across the English Channel from Dover,
England to Calais, France. 20 While this cable did not last more than a few messages, its creation marked the beginning of the submarine cable industry. 21 Advances in laying technique, design, and material meant that submarine telegraph cables were becoming increasingly durable and “[b]y the early 20th century, much of the world was connected by a network that enabled rapid communication and dissemination of information for government, commerce and
the public.” 22 However, submarine telegraph cables soon faced growing competition from radio telegraph technology, which had greatly improved during
World War I. 23 Facing the global depression of the 1930s, the submarine telegraph cable industry steadily declined. 24
The end of the submarine telegraph era, however, saw the emergence of a
new submarine communications cable, namely the submarine telephone cable.
During the 1930s, a polyethylene-encased cable with a copper coaxial core was
16 See, e.g., Submarine Network Solutions: Crossing Oceans to Connect the Planet,
ALCATEL-LUCENT, https://www.alcatel-lucent.com/solutions/submarine-networks (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
17 See Patrick J. Kiger, New Energy Projects Boost the Use of Undersea Power Cables,
GEO.
(Aug.
18,
2014,
11:03
AM),
NAT’L
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/08/140819-submarine-power-cablesoffshore-wind/.
18 Intagliata & Silver Sweeney, supra note 8.
19 Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 19, 20 (Douglas R. Burnett, et al., eds., 2014).
20 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 12.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 13.
23 Ash, supra note 19, at 27-28.
24 Id.
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developed which allowed multiple voice channels to be realized. 25 In 1955 and
1956, two cables were laid between Scotland and Newfoundland called TAT-1
and thus began the age of submarine coaxial telephone communications. 26 During the 1960s, there were a slew of technological developments in design and
laying techniques that enabled longer cables to be laid deeper in the ocean.27
However, as with submarine telegraph cables, submarine telephone cables
soon faced competition from satellite communications due to the former’s
lower capacity and relatively high cost. 28 During the 1970s and 1980s, satellites
emerged as the primary means of telecommunications. 29 The last submarine
telephone cable was laid between India and the United Arab Emirates in 1986
bringing the submarine telephone cable era to an end. 30
That was not, however, the end of the submarine cable story. In 1966, two
scientists made a discovery that would revolutionize telecommunications. 31 Dr.
Charles Kao and Dr. George Hockham found “a fibre [sic] of glassy material
constructed in a cladded structure” had “important potential as a new form of
communication medium . . . compared with existing coaxial and radio systems” due to its “large information capacity and possible advantages in basic
material cost.” 32 This milestone discovery facilitated the development of terrestrial fiber optic systems in the late 1970s and in 1980, the first sea trial of a
submarine fiber optic system occurred. 33 In 1986, a series of fiber optic submarine cables were installed, and thus began the fiber-optics era. 34 In 1988, the
first trans-oceanic fiber optic cable linking the United States, United Kingdom,
and France was installed and from this year onwards, submarine cables “started to outperform satellites in terms of the volume, speed and economics of data
and voice communications.” 35 This coincided with the release of the commercial Internet in the mid-1990s. 36 Essentially, these two technologies taken together revolutionized telecommunications:
CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 14.
Id. (noting that the submarine telephone cables carried 707 calls between London and
North America on the first day of operation).
27 Id. at 14-15.
28 Ash, supra note 19, at 32.
29 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15.
30 Ash, supra note 19, at 32.
31 G.A. Hockham & K.C. Kao, Dialectric-fibre Surface Waveguides for Optical Frequencies, 113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. OF. ELEC. ENG’RS, no.7, July 1966, at 1151, 1158.
32 G.A. Hockham & K.C. Kao, Dialectric-fibre Surface Waveguides for Optical Frequencies, 113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. OF. ELEC. ENG’RS, no.3, July 1986, at 198.
33 See Ash, supra note 19, at 33-34.
34 See id. at 34.
35 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 16.
36 See Barry M. Leiner et. al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC.,
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
25
26
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[C]ables carried large volumes of voice and data traffic with speed and security; the
internet made that data and information accessible and usable for a multitude of purposes. As a result, communications, business, commerce, education and entertainment
underwent radical change. 37

Today’s modern submarine communications cables consist of a set of six to
24 glass fibers, an electrical conductor, an internal steel strength member, and
a protective sheath of marine grade polypropylene, which are constructed to
withstand harsh environmental conditions for up to 25 years. 38 Depending on
where it is laid, a cable may have a protective armor (used on the continental
shelf) composed of steel wires. 39 Cables without protective armor are usually
laid in the deep ocean and are typically 17-20 millimeter (mm) diameter,
whereas armored fiber-optic cables may reach 50 mm diameter. 40 “Cable sections and amplifiers, which boost the light signals carried by the glass fibers,
are assembled into a nearly complete system, coiled in tanks in a factory and
then loaded onto special cable-laying ships for installation.” 41
B. Critical Communications Infrastructure
The United Nations, in 2010, described submarine communications cables
as “critical communications infrastructure” and “vitally important to the global
economy and the national security of all States.” 42 This is not an understatement. Today, submarine fiber optic cables provide the vast majority of international telecommunications—some 95% overall. 43 The global cable network is
composed of an estimated 213 independent cable systems amounting to approximately 877,122 kilometers of fiber optic cables. 44 The majority of counCARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 16.
Ronald J. Rapp, Director, Cable Eng’g & Tech., Tyco Elec. Subsea Commc’n LLC,
Submarine Cables: Critical Infrastructure Supplier Perspective, Address Before the 34th
Annual Center for Oceans Law and Policy Conference 5 (May 21, 2010) [hereinafter Rapp,
Submarine Cables], http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Rapp-Presentation.pdf.
39 Ronald J. Rapp, Director, Indus. & Mar. Liason, TE SubCom, Cable Laying and Repair – Cable Ship Operations, Address Before the Submarine Cables in the Sargasso Sea
Workshop 6 (Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Rapp, Cable Laying & Repair],
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Rapp-Presentation.pdf.
40 Id. at 7.
41 DOUGLAS BURNETT ET AL., SUBMARINE CABLES IN THE SARGASSO SEA: LEGAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 10 (2015) [hereinafter
BURNETT ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT],
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/cil-news-highlights/submarine-cables-in-the-sargasso-sea-finalworkshop-report-published/
42 G.A. Res. 65/37, ¶ 121 (Dec. 7, 2010).
43 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
44 Douglas Burnett et al., Introduction: Why Submarine Cables? to SUBMARINE CABLES:
THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 1, 2 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
37
38
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tries now rely on submarine cables for their communications needs and as of
mid-2012, only 21 nations and territories remain unconnected to the fiber network with several of them having projects underway. 45 The global submarine
network forms the backbone of the Internet, and consequently e-mail, social
media, phone and banking services; goods and services we now take for granted.
With regard to financial services, it has been estimated that submarine cables “carry an excess of 10 trillion [U.S. dollars] a day in transactions.” 46 Similarly, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
(SWIFT) relies on cables to transmit financial data to “more than 8,300 member financial institutions in 195 countries.” 47 “The U.S. Clearing House Interbank Payment System processes over 1 trillion [dollars] a day to more than 22
countries.” 48
From a global and national security perspective, submarine communications
cables also play an essential role. For example, “a major portion of the [U.S.
Department of Defense] data traveling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) video, essential for war preparation.” 49 As one scholar observed, “without ensured cable connectivity, the future of modern warfare is in
jeopardy.” 50 A further example of the importance of cables to the military is the
development of the Global Information Grid (GiG) by the U.S. Department of
Defense. 51 The GiG is the “globally, interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support personnel.” 52 The Grid utilizes portions of the international telecommunications
systems and has been described as a “global network that can be used to control a global battlespace.” 53
Another recently developed use for submarine fiber optic cables is providing
Id.
Michael Sechrist, New Threats, Old Technology: Vulnerabilities In Undersea Communications Cable Network Management Systems 9 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Belfer Ctr. for
Sci. & Int’l Affs., Discussion Paper No. 2012-03, 2012) [hereinafter Sechrist, New Threats],
https://citizenlab.org/cybernorms2012/sechrist.pdf.
47 Id. at 10.
48 Id.
49 MICHAEL SECHRIST, CYBERSPACE IN DEEP WATER: PROTECTING UNDERSEA COMMUNICATION CABLES BY CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 6 (2010)
DEEP
WATER],
[hereinafter
SECHRIST,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf.
50 Id. at 5.
51 Id.;
see generally Global Information Grid, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY,
https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/global_information_grid/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
52 Global Information Grid, supra note 51.
53 Robert Fonow, Cybersecurity Demands Physical Security, SIGNAL MAG., Feb. 2006,
at 43, 44, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=cybersecurity-demands-physical-security.
45
46
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connectivity for offshore oil and gas installations. 54 “Communications between
onshore facilities and offshore oil and gas facilities have historically been a
challenge for the oil and gas industry” due to distance to land and space constraints on the installation itself. 55 Submarine fiber optic cables are now being
increasingly utilized to link onshore oil and gas facilities to a variety of assets
based in the sea, including conventional fixed platforms, floating platforms,
and storage. 56 This facilitates real-time monitoring with sensors, collaboration,
video surveillance, and work management systems as well as other applications that require continuous connectivity. 57
Additionally, submarine communications cables are proving invaluable for
scientific development. 58 In recent years, developments in technology have
allowed submarine communications cables to be used for the collection of
oceanographic data from the marine environment. 59 In this facet, “scientists
have utilized submarine communications cables to transport data in real time
from ocean observatories that collect oceanographic data.” 60 Additionally,
“there has been interest in using submarine communications cables not to just
transport data but also to collect data by placing scientific sensors on these cables.” 61 Scientists believe that the placement of sensors on these cables will
allow for the collection of data on ocean temperature, salinity, and water pressure which could lead to disaster risk reduction and real-time monitoring of the
oceans and climate. 62
The many uses for communications cables are boundless and in many ways,
submarine cables have emerged as one of the most important uses of the
oceans. There is no doubt these “unseen and unsung cables are the true skeleton and nerve of our world, linking our countries together in a fiber optic
web.” 63
54 See generally Wayne F. Nielsen & Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables and Offshore
Energy, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 351, 351-54 (Douglas
R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
55 Id. at 351.
56 Id. at 353.
57 Id.; see GoM Fiber Optic Network, BP GLOBAL, http://www.gomfiber.com/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
58 See generally Lionel Carter & Alfred H.A Soons, Marine Scientific Research Cables,
in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 323, 325-28 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014); see also Davenport, A New Frontier, supra note 10, at 210-13.
59 Davenport, A New Frontier, supra note 10, at 210.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.; see also RHETT BUTLER, USING SUBMARINE CABLES FOR CLIMATE MONITORING AND
DISASTER
WARNING
3
(2012),
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itut/oth/4B/04/T4B040000150001PDFE.pdf.
63 U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 59th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.59 (Dec. 7, 2010).
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C. The Submarine Cable Industry
Two brothers, Jacob and John Brett, formed a British company called the
English Channel Submarine Telegraph Company and developed the first submarine cable that was laid between Dover and Calais in 1850. 64 Telegraphs
were perceived as benefitting trade and commerce, and thus it was inevitable
that the industry would be driven by private investment. 65 This private commercial model employed by the Brett Brothers shaped the way in which the
industry would develop and this structure remains prevalent today. 66 In the early stages, “British companies, with the assistance of the Empire, owned and
controlled the vast majority of the submarine [telegraph] cable network.” 67
However, other powers like France, Germany and Russia “were jarred to reality by the way in which Britain had put its control over large portions of the
global telegraph cable infrastructure to great strategic and military advantage
during the war,” and thus they began their own cable laying program to shatter
the British monopoly. 68 Indeed, in order to break their dependence on British
cables, other countries started to investigate other technologies, such as the
wireless telegraph, which in part caused the demise of the telegraph. 69
Today, there are many private cable enterprises from various jurisdictions.
There are two main types of cable companies involved in the industry. 70 The
first category is the cable system owner that owns and/or operates the system. 71
They can consist of national telecommunications carriers, private companies
and/or investment banks. 72 A trans-oceanic cable can cost up to 500 million
U.S. dollars, and therefore, more often than not, these companies form consortiums of about 20-30 telecommunications companies to fund the design, construction, and maintenance of a new cable in return for a proportionate share of
capacity. 73
64 GRAEME MARETT, A HISTORY OF THE TELEGRAPH IN JERSEY: 1858 – 1940, at 2-3
(2009), http://www.marett.org/telecom/telegraph.pdf.
65 Jonathon W. Penney, The Cycles of Global Telecommunication Censorship and Surveillance, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 693, 704 (2015).
66 Id. at 703.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 716.
69 Id. at 721.
70 Mick Green, The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does it Work?, in SUBMARINE
CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 41, 42 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 43.
73 Id. at 46. For example, the Southern Cross Cable, which is located in Australian waters provides international bandwidth to Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, and the continental United States. It cost $1.5 billion dollars to build and is jointly owned by Telecom New
Zealand, SingTel Optus and Verizon Business. See Our Company: About Southern Cross, S.
CROSS CABLES NETWORK, http://www.southerncrosscables.com/home/company (last visited
Oct. 13, 2015).
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The second category of cable companies comprises the cable suppliers who
are responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of submarine
cables. 74 These include the system suppliers who design, plan, and manufacture
the cable system; the marine service suppliers who provide specialist vessels
for cable installation operations; and the cable joint suppliers who supply joints
and associated equipment required to replace damaged cables with new cables. 75
The International Cable Protection Committee (“ICPC”), established in
1958, is an industry-based organization whose members include owners, operators, and suppliers of over 97 percent of the world’s international submarine
cable systems. 76 In 2010, membership was opened to governments, and several
governments are now represented. 77 The ICPC issues Recommendations on
various issues concerning submarine cables and has been instrumental in working with governments, international organizations, and other seabed users to
preserve the integrity of the submarine cable network. 78
At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that cables, unlike vessels, are not registered to any nationality. 79 The consortia or private companies that own and
operate them are from various countries, as are the cable suppliers that construct them. One cable can span many different jurisdictions and for this reason, submarine cables are the very essence of transnational infrastructure.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING SUBMARINE
CABLES
Submarine cables were recognized early on as a public good that ought to be
protected and regulated. 80 From 1863 to 1913, the protection of submarine cables appeared on the agenda of seven international conferences. 81 Between
1884 and 1982, the international community adopted four legal instruments
that addressed the rights and obligations of States vis-à-vis submarine cables.
These are: (1) the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph
Green, supra note 70, at 42.
Id. at 42-44.
76 See
About the ICPC, INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM. (Jul. 24, 2015),
https://www.iscpc.org/about-the-icpc/.
77 Id.
78 See e.g., ICPC Recommendations, INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM. (Dec. 22, 2014),
https://www.iscpc.org/publications/recommendations/.
79 Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 83-84 [hereinafter High Seas Convention].
80 United Nations Documents on the Development and Codification of International
Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 29, 33-34 (1947).
81 Id.
74
75
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Cables (“1884 Cable Convention”); 82 (2) the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas;83 (3) the 1958 Convention on Continental Shelf; 84 and (4) the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 85
The 1884 Cable Convention is a stand-alone convention dealing solely with
the protection of submarine telegraph cables. 86 The convention’s primary goal
was to require State adoption of legislation that protected cables laying outside
of territorial waters; 87 and presently has 40 State Parties. 88
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the High Seas and the Continental Shelf
(“the 1958 Geneva Conventions”) and UNCLOS are broad, comprehensive
treaties that address various aspects of law of the sea. For purposes of this Article, UNCLOS is assumed to be the applicable legal regime governing submarine cables. 89
The adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 was a milestone in international law and
relations. 90 The 320 articles and 9 annexes, often described as a “constitution
for the oceans” 91 took nine years to negotiate and involved more than 140
States, six non-independent States, eight national liberation movements, 12
specialized agencies, 19 intergovernmental organizations, and a number of
quasi-autonomous units of the U.N. 92 One hundred and nineteen States signed
82 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 24
Stat. 989, T.S. No 380 [hereinafter 1884 Cable Convention].
83 High Seas Convention, supra note 79, at 82.
84 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter
Continental Shelf Convention].
85 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
86 See generally 1884 Cable Convention, supra note 82, art. 1.
87 Douglas R. Burnett et al., Overview of the International Legal Regime Governing
Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 63, 66
(Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Burnett et al., Overview].
88 Id. at 64.
89 UNCLOS has received widespread acceptance and presently has 167 Parties. See
Status of U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLL.,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). For parties to both the
1958 Geneva Conventions and UNCLOS, the latter supersedes the former. See UNCLOS,
supra note 85, art. 311, ¶ 1. Further, most of the UNCLOS provisions on submarine cables
are based on the provisions found in the 1958 High Seas Convention which codified existing
customary international law. See Burnett, Overview, supra note 87, at 65. These provisions
are consequently binding on non-parties. Id.
90 See generally The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical
perspective), U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & THE LAW OF THE SEA,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
91 See Tommy T.B. Koh, Former Singapore Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks Before the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 11, 1982),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.
92 For an overview of the negotiating history of the Third Conference on the Law of the
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the Convention and it presently has 167 States Parties. 93 UNCLOS purports to
establish a “legal order for the seas and oceans” 94 by demarcating zones of juridical competence and assigning different rights and obligations to coastal
States and other users of the sea. 95 These maritime zones can be generally categorized as (1) areas under territorial sovereignty (the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, straits used for international navigation); (2) areas outside sovereignty but within national jurisdiction (the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf) and (3) areas beyond national jurisdiction (high seas and the deep
seabed). 96
UNCLOS addresses the rights and obligations of States for both the protection of submarine cables and the freedom to lay, repair and maintain such cables (the installation of cables), the scope and extent of which are determined
by where these cable activities are taking place. 97
A. The Installation of Submarine Cables
Cable installation on the seabed involves three distinct phases. First, the optimal cable route must be determined. 98 This initially involves a Desktop Survey, which takes into account landing sites, seabed bathymetry and geology,
fishing and anchoring uses, cable and pipeline crossings, permitting requirements of coastal States and other constraints, such as boundaries. 99 The Desktop Survey is followed by a cable route survey by a survey vessel in order to
“fully characterize that route and to avoid hazards and/or environmentally sig-

Sea, see Tommy T.B. Koh & Shanmugam Jayakumar, The Negotiating Process of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 29-68 (Myron Nordquist et al. eds., 1985)
[hereinafter 1 UNCLOS COMMENTARY].
93 See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and
the Related Agreements as at 3 October 2014, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & THE LAW OF
THE
SEA,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015).
94 UNCLOS, supra note 85, pmbl.
95 Id.
96 Id. arts. 2, 46, 55, 76, 86.
97 Id. arts. 79, 112, 113.
98 Subsea Cables – Installation Procedures and Methods, KINGFISHER INFO. SERV.OFFSHORE RENEWABLE & CABLES AWARENESS, http://www.kis-orca.eu/subseacables/installation-procedures-and-methods#.Vg8GoxNViko (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
99 See generally Graham Evans & Monique Page, The Planning and Surveying of Submarine Cable Routes, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 93, 9495 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
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nificant zones that may not have been identified from existing information.” 100
“The selection of the final route is determined by a cost-benefit analysis of the
cost of laying a cable along a particular route versus the need to protect the
cable.” 101 Thus, the final selection will be the route that best “avoid[s] hazards
and obstacles such as fishing areas, anchorages, military operation areas, munitions or other dumping areas and environmentally sensitive areas.” 102
The second stage is the laying of the cable on the seabed. 103 A cable is deployed along the previously designated route by trained crew on specialized
cable-laying vessels, which spool the cable out of huge holding tanks. 104 Depending on the route, the cable will either be buried beneath the seabed or laid
on the seabed surface. Typically, cables will be surface laid in water depths
deeper than 1500 meters—a depth beyond the reach of risky human activities
such as anchoring and fishing. 105 Once laid on the seabed close to land, cables
cross a beach and enter a “beach manhole”, running a land route until it reaches the cable landing station, a shore terminal building. 106 In short, the beginning
and ending points of undersea cable systems are the landing stations which
provide a gateway to landline communication networks. 107
The third stage is cable repair and maintenance. 108 Typically, a cable’s
lifespan is 15 – 20 years, during which time, it may need to be retrieved from
the seabed for repairs or maintenance. 109 Repairs entail finding the location of
the cable, identifying the faulted section and replacing that section with a new
cable. 110
1. The High Seas
Since the laying of the first submarine cable in 1850, the freedom to lay
submarine cables in the high seas has been unchallenged 111 and subsequently
CARTER ET AL., supra note 9 at 21.
BURNETT ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 41, at 10.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 11.
104 See Keith Ford-Ramsden & Tara Davenport, The Manufacture and Laying of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 123, 127-28
(Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
105 BURNETT ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-11.
106 Tara Davenport, Submarine Communications Cables and Law of the Sea: Problems
in Law and Practice, in 43 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 201, 204 (2012) [hereinafter Davenport,
Submarine Cables].
107 Michael Matis, The Protection of Undersea Cables: A Global Security Threat 7 (July
3, 2012) (unpublished M.S.S. dissertation, U.S. Army War College) (on file with author).
108 Davenport, Submarine Cables, supra note 106, at 204.
109 Id.
110 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 24.
111 See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS:
100
101
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affirmed in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 112 and UNCLOS. 113 Article
87 of UNCLOS states that the freedom of the high seas includes the freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI, on the continental
shelf. 114 Article 112 (1) of UNCLOS reinforces this by stipulating that “all
States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high
seas beyond the continental shelf.” 115 While not explicitly mentioned, there is
no doubt that survey, repair and maintenance activities that are an essential
component of cable operations are included in the freedom to lay cables in the
high seas. 116
However, the freedom is not completely unlimited. First, Article 112 (2) requires States to have due regard to cables already in position and not to prejudice the possibility of repairing existing cables or pipelines. 117 Second, the
freedom to lay submarine cables must be exercised with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of high seas freedoms (such as fishing
and navigation) in addition to the due regard for the rights under UNCLOS
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 781 (1962). The 1884 Cable Convention dealt only with the protection of submarine cables and not the freedom to lay cables
because “[i]t was evident that freedom of use was conceded by all and that the real concern
was to adopt measures for protecting cables from other, sometimes physically incompatible
uses of the ocean.” Id.
112 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, ¶ 192, 5
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 12, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 364, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1. In 1950, the International Law
Commission (ILC) first recognized the principle that all States were entitled to lay submarine cables on the high seas. See Summary Records of the 65th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 199, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1950. Indeed, at the second session of the ILC, it
was observed that there was no need to explicitly mention the freedom to lay cables in any
convention on the topic as this freedom had never been questioned. Id. However, it was
ultimately agreed that that it was important to include it in any convention on the law of the
sea. See High Seas Convention, supra note 79, arts. 2, 26 ¶ 1. Accordingly, Article 27 of the
ILC Draft Articles states that freedom of the high seas comprises, amongst other things, the
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines and article 61 recognizes that “all States shall
be entitled to lay telegraph, telephone or high-voltage power cables and pipelines on the bed
of the high seas.” 1 SIR ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998:
THE TREATIES 58, 92 (1999).
113 See UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 112.
114 Id. art. 87, ¶ 1. This is in recognition of the fact that for cables which are laid on the
extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the continental shelf regime on submarine cables
and not the high seas regime will apply.
115 Id. art. 112, ¶ 1.
116 Id. art. 79, ¶ 5. Article 112 (2) of UNCLOS states that Article 79 (5) (found in Part VI
on the continental shelf) applies to cables laid in the high seas. Id. art. 112, ¶ 2. Article 79
(5) states that “possibilities of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.”
This reinforces the position that the freedom to lay also includes the freedom to repair. Id.
art. 79, ¶ 5.
117 Id.
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with respect to activities in the area where deep seabed mining takes place and
that which is under the purview of the International Seabed Authority. 118
At this juncture, it warrants noting that UNCLOS affords the freedom to lay
cables to “all States.” 119 In reality, as previously mentioned, it is private companies that own and operate cables, and it is private companies that lay and
repair cables. The Virginia Commentary noted that the term “all States” should
not be read restrictively as “[i]n practice, many submarine cables and pipelines
are privately owned and are laid by corporations or other private entities. The
term therefore refers to the right of States or their nationals to lay cables or
pipelines.” 120
2. The Exclusive Economic Zone / Continental Shelf
During the negotiations of UNCLOS, the long-recognized freedom to lay
submarine cables on the high seas had to be adapted to take into account the
interests of the coastal State and other States in the newly established maritime
zones of the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”). 121
Both these maritime zones are areas in which the coastal State did not have
sovereignty but instead had sovereign rights to resources that could impact the
freedom to lay cables and vice versa.
Under the continental shelf regime in Part VI of UNCLOS, a coastal state
has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the continental shelf and exploiting its natural resources, 122 which include “mineral and other non-living
resources of the seabed and subsoil.” 123 The continental shelf is defined as:
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance. 124

The EEZ regime in Part V of UNCLOS, recognized the rights of the coastal
State to claim a 200 nautical mile (nm) EEZ that gives coastal States sovereign
rights to the exploration and exploitation of both living and non-living reId. art. 87, ¶ 2.
Id.
120 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 264
(Myron Nordquist et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter 3 UNCLOS COMMENTARY].
121 UNCLOS, supra note 85, arts. 56, 79. While the existence of the continental shelf
pre-dated UNCLOS and was recognized in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, the definition of the continental shelf changed significantly during the negotiations of UNCLOS.
See generally 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 841-84 (Myron Nordquist et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY].
122 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 77, ¶ 1.
123 Id. art. 77, ¶ 4.
124 Id. art. 76.
118
119
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sources of “the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil.” 125 A coastal State also has jurisdiction, as provided in UNCLOS, over
artificial islands, installations, and structures; marine scientific research; and
the protection and preservation of the marine environment in its EEZ. 126
Both the EEZ and the continental shelf regime give the coastal State two
distinct legal bases for rights over the seabed within 200 nm. However, the
negotiators of UNCLOS recognized the need to harmonize the content of the
legal interest within two separate regimes that geographically overlapped. 127
Accordingly, Article 56 (3) of UNCLOS provides that the rights set out in the
EEZ regarding the seabed and subsoil are to be “exercised in accordance with
Part VI on the continental shelf [emphasis added].” 128 The provisions on submarine cables in Part V and Part VI, while not drafted in identical terms, essentially result in the same rights and obligations with respect to submarine cables,
in areas within 200 nm of the coast. In situations where a coastal state has an
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm (i.e. an outer continental
shelf), the continental shelf regime solely applies. 129
UNCLOS affirms that all States have the freedom to lay submarine cables in
the EEZ and continental shelf. In the EEZ, Article 58 provides:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention (emphasis added). 130

As mentioned above, Article 87 provides that freedoms of the high seas include the “freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI
[on the continental shelf].” 131 Similarly, Part VI reinforces this right on the continental shelf by stipulating in Article 79 (1) that “all States are entitled to lay
Id. art. 56.
Id.
127 MALCOLM EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION 36
(1989).
128 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 56, ¶ 3.
129 The waters above the outer continental shelf are high seas, but Article 87(1)(c) recognizes that the freedom
to lay cables in the high seas is subject to Part VI on the continental shelf. Id. art. 87, ¶ 1.
130 Id. art. 58.
131 Id. art. 87. The Virginia Commentary on UNCLOS notes that the high sea freedoms
exercised in the EEZ by other States are the same as those incorporated from Article 87,
provided that they are compatible with the other provisions of UNCLOS. The difference is
that these freedoms are subject to measures related to the sovereign rights of the coastal
state in the EEZ and they are not subject to such measures or those rights beyond that zone.
2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 564-65.
125
126

2015]

Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity & International Law

73

submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf in accordance with the
provisions of this article.” 132
Laying of submarine cables also includes the right to repair and maintain
them as these activities would be considered “other internationally lawful uses
of the sea related to these freedoms . . . such as those associated with the operation of . . . submarine cables” in the EEZ. 133 With regard to the continental
shelf, Article 79 (1) does not explicitly refer to repair or maintenance, however, the rest of Article 79 assumes that the right to lay submarine cables includes
the right to maintain and repair them. 134 Similarly, cable route surveys should
also be considered an “internationally lawful use of the sea related . . . to the
operation of . . . submarine cables” as they are essential to the laying of cables. 135
However, the right to lay submarine cables and associated rights is not unlimited. First, States or companies conducting cable operations in the
EEZ/continental shelf must have due regard to the cables or pipelines already
in position and must not prejudice the possibilities of repairing existing cables
or pipelines. 136
Second, such states or companies must have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state in the EEZ 137 and in the continental shelf, to the extent
the latter overlaps with the EEZ. The rights and duties of the coastal State refers to the rights and duties enumerated in Article 56 and elaborated on in other
UNCLOS provisions, namely, rights over the exploration and exploitation of:
living resources; nonliving resources; other economic resources such as the
production of energy from the water, currents, and winds; jurisdiction over
artificial islands, installations, and structures; jurisdiction over marine scientific research; and jurisdiction over the protection and preservation of the marine environment, and the consequent duties that accompany such jurisdiction. 138
Third, states conducting cable operations “shall comply with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part.” 139 The question is to what extent a coastal State
can regulate cable operations in the EEZ/continental shelf.
UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 79, ¶ 1.
Id. art. 58.
134 See id. art.79, ¶ 2 (referring to the “laying or maintenance” of submarine cables); Id.
art. 79 ¶ 5 (referring to “repairing” existing cables).
135 Id. art. 58.
136 Id. art. 79, ¶ 5.
137 Id. art. 58.
138 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 56.
139 Id. art. 58.
132
133
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In this regard, “UNCLOS has substantive provisions on the type of regulations coastal States may adopt, as well as procedural obligations that must be
complied with if such regulations are adopted.” 140 First, Article 79 (2) of UNCLOS states:
Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental
shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede the laying or
maintenance of such cables or pipelines. 141

Article 79 (2) appears to distinguish between submarine cables and pipelines. Specifically, with respect to pipelines, a coastal State is permitted to impose reasonable measures for (1) the exploration of the continental shelf; (2)
the exploitation of its natural resources and (3) the prevention, reduction, and
control of pollution from pipelines. 142 For submarine cables, a coastal State can
only subject it to reasonable measures for the (1) exploration of the continental
shelf and (2) the exploitation of its natural resources. This appears to be in
recognition of the belief that submarine cables do not cause pollution. 143
Second, Article 79 (3) states that the “delineation of the course for the laying
of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal
State.” 144 The clear implication is that the delineation of the course for submarine cables is not subject to the consent of the coastal State. This is supported
by the legislative history of the provision. 145 However, it has been argued that
the coastal State can still impose conditions for the delineation of the cable
route pursuant to the right to impose “reasonable measures” for the exploration
of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources as set out in
Article 79 (3). 146 For example, the coastal State could require that the route
avoid areas in which offshore exploration/exploitation is taking place or areas
that are intensively fished.
Third, Article 79 (4) provides that nothing in Part VI “affects the right of the
coastal State to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory

Davenport, Submarine Cables, supra note 106, at 210.
UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 79, ¶ 2.
142 The provision for prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines did
not exist in the equivalent article (Article 4) of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, and
was added during the negotiations of UNCLOS III. See 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra
note 121, at 912.
143 See Lionel Carter, Douglas Burnett, & Tara Davenport, The Relationship Between
Submarine Cables and the Marine Environment, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND POLICY 179, 183 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
144 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 79, ¶ 3.
145 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 915.
146 See Rainer Lagoni, Legal Aspects of Submarine High Voltage Direct Current
(HVDC) Cables 20 (1998); see also UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 79, ¶ 3.
140
141
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or territorial sea . . . .” 147 This reflects the fact that in its territorial sea and land
territory, coastal States have sovereignty over submarine cables and can impose conditions for their operation within these areas. The purpose of this provision is to ensure:
[T]he restrictions in article 79 on the right of a coastal State to regulate cables on the
continental shelf [where it has sovereign rights but not sovereignty] does not affect the
more extensive rights of the coastal State to impose additional conditions on cables
which enter its territory or territorial sea [where it has sovereignty]. 148

Apart from the above substantive rights that coastal States have in relation to
the regulation of submarine cables, UNCLOS also imposes certain procedural
obligations on coastal States when exercising their rights to regulate submarine
cables. First, these measures must be “reasonable” as required in Article 79
(2). 149 The term “reasonable” is admittedly vague but “no more definite criterion than that of reasonableness could be established for the measures which
coastal states may take, for the reason that it was impossible to foresee all situations that might arise in the application of [this article].” 150 The second procedural obligation is that in the EEZ (and in the continental shelf to the extent it
overlaps with the EEZ), a coastal state must have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions
of UNCLOS. 151 Third, on the continental shelf (and in the EEZ to the extent it
overlaps with the continental shelf), a coastal state must not exercise its rights
in a manner that will infringe or result in “any unjustifiable interference” with
navigation and other rights and freedoms of other states as provided for in
UNCLOS. 152
3. Submarine Cables Under the Jurisdiction of the Coastal State
UNCLOS provides for an exception to the freedom to lay submarine cables
in the EEZ/continental shelf. 153 Under Article 79 (4), submarine cables “used in
connection with the exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its
resources or the operations of artificial islands, installations and structures unUNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 79, ¶ 4.
Robert Beckman, Director, Ctr. for Int’l Law Nat’l Univ. of Sing., Submarine Cables—A Critically Important but Neglected Area of the Law of the Sea, Presented Before
the 7th International Conference on Legal Regimes of Sea, Air, Space and Antarctica 7 (Jan.
17, 2010) [hereinafter Beckman, Critically Important], cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2010/01/Beckman-PDF-ISIL-Submarine-Cables- rev-8-Jan-10.pdf.
149 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 79, ¶ 2.
150 Marjorie Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 629, 642 (1958).
151 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 56.
152 Id. art. 78.
153 Id. art. 79.
147
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der its jurisdiction” are under the jurisdiction of the coastal State. 154
The coastal State’s jurisdiction over submarine cables under Article 79 (4) is
a direct consequence of its sovereign rights over the resources of the continental shelf/EEZ as well as over other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone (such as the production of energy from water, currents
and winds), 155 and its jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial
islands, installations, and structures. 156 This provision would appear to apply to
submarine communications and power cables used to provide communications
for oil and gas platforms and wind farms.
4. Territorial Seas
Under UNCLOS, a coastal State has sovereignty over 12 nautical miles of
sea known as the territorial sea. 157 Pursuant to their sovereignty over the territorial sea, 158 coastal States clearly have extensive authority to regulate ships engaged in cable operations (i.e. the surveying of cable routes and the laying,
repair, and maintenance of cables in these maritime zones). Coastal States will
usually require the whole gamut of permits, licenses, and environmental conditions to be met before permission is given to deploy a power cable in these
maritime zones. 159
B. The Protection of Submarine Cables
The protection of submarine cables has always been a concern of the international community as early as the 1880s when the 1884 Cable Convention
was adopted. 160 Within the territorial sea, coastal States 161 have an express right
to adopt laws and regulations “relating to innocent passage through their territorial sea” in order to protect submarine cables. 162 They also have a general
competence to enact laws to protect submarine cables within such territorial
waters. 163 However, under UNCLOS there is no obligation on coastal States to
adopt laws and regulations to protect submarine cables within territorial waId. art. 79, ¶ 4.
Id. arts. 56, 77.
156 Id. arts. 56, 80.
157 Id. art. 3.
158 Id. art. 2.
159 See generally Ford-Ramsden & Davenport, supra note 104, at 140-46 (relating to the
regulations imposed on communications cables in territorial waters).
160 See 1884 Cable Convention, supra note 82.
161 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 21.
162 Id.
163 Id.
154
155
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ters. 164
Outside territorial waters, namely the EEZ, continental shelf and high seas,
there are express provisions in UNCLOS on the protection of cables that apply.
Articles 113 to 115 of UNCLOS address the protection of submarine cables on
the high seas and are based on three articles in the 1884 Cable Convention. 165
They are also applicable to submarine cables laid in the EEZ under Article
58(2) as well as to cables laid on the continental shelf. 166
Article 113 of UNCLOS requires States to adopt laws and regulations to
provide that the breaking or injuring by a ship flying its flag or by a person
subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or through culpable negligence, is a punishable offense. 167 Such laws and
regulations must also apply to conduct calculated or likely to result in such
breaking or injuring. However, it shall not apply to any break or injury caused
by persons whom acted to save lives or their ships, after having taken all necessary precautions to avoid such an occurrence. 168 Article 113 essentially extends a State’s criminal jurisdiction (usually limited to territory) over acts of
breaking or injury to submarine cables done “willfully or through culpable
negligence.” 169 This extension of jurisdiction only applies to ships flying the
State’s flag on the high seas or EEZ, or to its nationals whom commit such
acts, consistent with general principles of international law on the prescription
of extra-territorial jurisdiction. 170
Article 114 of UNCLOS, which is based on Article IV of the 1884 Cable
Convention, requires every State to adopt laws and regulations concerning the
liability of owners of cables for the cost of repairs to existing cables which are
damaged in the course of laying or repair operations. 171
Article 115, which is based on Article VII of the 1884 Cable Convention,
provides that every State should adopt laws and regulations to provide for an
indemnity to be paid by cable owners to ship owners whose master sacrifices
an anchor, a net or any other fishing gear in order to avoid injuring a submarine cable, provided that the ship owner has taken all reasonable precautionary
measures beforehand. 172
III. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH SUBMARINE CABLE
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id. arts. 113-115.
UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 58, ¶ 2.
Id. art. 113.
Id.
Id.
Davenport, Submarine Cables, supra note 106, at 218.
UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 114.
Id. art. 115.
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SYSTEMS
Submarine cables are laid on the seabed and are vulnerable to a host of
threats including fishing and shipping activity as well as natural hazards such
as earthquakes. Eighty per cent of cable faults are estimated to be attributable
to human activity, with fishing being responsible for more than 60 percent of
all human activity faults. 173 Cable faults can take several forms, including damage to the outer insulation that results in seawater seeping in and damaging the
power conductor as well as the optical fibers so that they can no longer transmit light or a complete break in the cable. 174 Cable owners and operators utilize
Network Operations Centers (NOCs) to monitor data traffic “through their
networks on a 24/7 basis and are able to immediately identify any interruption
to the traffic or a change in the normal operating conditions of the marine portion of the network.” 175
If an interruption does take place, the NOC operators will attempt to restore
traffic as soon as possible by using other cable systems pursuant to a mutual
restoration agreement. 176 If there are multiple simultaneous failures, there may
be significant delays in restoration. 177 Quickly identifying the fault and deploying a cable repair ship to fix it as soon as possible is imperative. 178 Given the
predominant dependence that today’s world has on communications cables, an
interruption in traffic could have serious consequences. For example, in a 2012
report on the Economic Impact of Submarine Cable Disruptions, it was estimated that the indirect economic costs of a fault in all the landing points in
Australia would amount to 3.169 million U.S. dollars, mostly due to the loss of
international internet traffic. 179
Since the September 11th attacks, there has been a growing concern about
the possibility of what will be broadly described as intentional interference
with submarine cable systems by State and/or non-State actors. 180 In this re173 Robert Wargo & Tara Davenport, Protecting Submarine Cables From Competing
Uses, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 255, 256 (Douglas R.
Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
174 Id.
175 Keith Ford-Ramsden & Douglas Burnett, Submarine Cable Repair and Maintenance,
in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 155, 158 (Douglas R. Burnett
et al. eds., 2014).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 ASIA PAC. ECON. COOP. POL’Y SUPPORT UNIT, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SUBMARINE CABLE
DISRUPTIONS
42
(2012),
http://www.suboptic.org/uploads/Economic%20Impact%20of%20Submarine%20Cable%20
Disruptions.pdf.
180 Paul Saffo, Disrupting Undersea Cables: Cyberspace’s Hidden Vulnerability, ATL.
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gard, intentional interference can take two potential forms. First is intentional
damage to the physical infrastructure of submarine cable systems, namely,
submarine cables laid on the seabed and cable landing stations. 181 The second
type is an attack involving the virtual or cyber aspect of submarine cable systems, and the exploit would entail hacking into the cable network management
systems used to operate cable systems and disrupting communications. 182 Both
will be dealt with in greater detail below.
A. Intentional Damage to Submarine Cables and Cable Landing Stations
The U.S. Department of Defense listed the world’s cable landing sites as
among the most critical of infrastructures for the United States. 183 Cable landing sites are concentrated in a few geographic areas due to high expense and
economies of scale. 184 According to one report, there are at least ten major cable chokepoints that exist globally. 185 As observed by one commentator:
The most dangerous vulnerability is the aggregation of high-capacity bandwidth circuits into a small number of unprotected carrier hotels in which several hundred network operators interconnect their circuits in one non-secure building. These buildings
often feed directly into the international undersea cable system. Security is often farcical. This lack of protection exists in several carrier hotels on transit points along the
axis of the international telecommunications system that includes Dubai, Zurich,
Frankfurt, London, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Hong Kong and
Singapore. 186

Apart from cable landing sites, another vulnerability is the vast network of
submarine cables on the seabed itself. Telecommunications companies “concentrate a large percentage of overall bandwidth in just a few major cable systems because new cable designs also incorporate tremendous capacity.” 187 Cables also tend to be bundled together, “offering a potentially lucrative, consolidated target for sabotage.” 188 If a bundle of cables are severed all at once, it
could result in responders having little to no chance of restoring the connection
by rerouting the traffic to mitigate the effects of the cut. 189 Due to the unpreCOUNCIL (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/disruptingundersea-cables-cyberspaces-hidden-vulnerability.
181 Sechrist, New Threats, supra note 46, at 15.
182 Id.
183 See Mark Clayton, WikiLeaks List of ‘Critical’ Sites: Is it a Menu for Terrorists?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ForeignPolicy/2010/1206/WikiLeaks-list-of-critical-sites-Is-it-a-menu-for-terrorists.
184 Sechrist, New Threats, supra note 46, at 9.
185 Id.
186 Fonow, supra note 53, at 43-44.
187 Laurence Reza Wrathall, The Vulnerability of Subsea Structure to Underwater Attack: Shortcomings and the Way Forward, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J 223, 231 (2010).
188 Id. at 232.
189 Id. at 232, n.40.
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dictable ocean environment, there are obvious challenges in actually carrying
out an attack, however, a disruption could occur as a result of something as
simple as dropping an anchor on a cable or sending a scuba diver down to
physically cut them (all cable routes are publicly available). 190 Further, one
scholar has pointed out the possibility of nefarious elements using an Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) to attack cables. 191
The possibility of intentional damage to submarine cables is not as farfetched as it first appears. Indeed, from the Crimean War in the 1850s, the British were well aware of “the strategic importance of the telegraph network and
its vulnerability to cable-cutting and other disruptions by hostile States.” 192 Indeed, the first act of the British in World War I was to cut Germany’s undersea
telegraph cable that left Germany with just one cable, which was in any event
under British control. 193 Germany retaliated by attempting to destroy Allied
telegraph cables in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and attacking telegraph stations and cables at Fanning Island and the Cocos Island in 1914, starting the
notorious cables wars. 194 Today, submarine cables are still legitimate targets
during wartime (the 1884 Cable Protection Convention explicitly provides that
obligations of protection contained in the Convention “do not in any way restrict the freedom of action of belligerents), 195 however, submarine cables between neutral countries, even during wartime, are inviolable and can not be
seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute necessity. 196
While there have been no large-scale attacks against cables since then, there
have been isolated incidents of deliberate cable damage. For example, in
March 2007, the Vietnamese military reported that a considerable amount of
cable had been discovered on Vietnamese soil, that some vessels had been
found with special cable cutting equipment and that cable coordinates were
being sold illegally. 197 This was followed by the discovery that 500 kilometers
Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables, supra note 11, at 283.
Wrathall, supra note 187, at 237-38.
192 Penney, supra note 65, at 704.
193 Elizabeth Bruton, From Australia to Zimmermann: A Brief History of Cable Telegraphy During World War I, at 1 (Sept. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), http://blogs.mhs.ox.ac.uk/innovatingincombat/files/2013/03/Innovating-in-Combateducational-resources-telegraph-cable-draft-1.pdf.
194 Id.
195 See 1884 Cable Convention, supra note 82, art. 15; John MacDonnell, Recent Changes in the Rights and Duties of Belligerents & Neutrals According to International Law, 17 J.
ROYAL UNITED SERV. INST., July-Dec. 1898, at 915, 916 (“Her Majesty’s Government takes
Article 15 to mean that in time of war, a belligerent who is a a signatory to the Convention,
will be free to act with respect to submarine cables, as if the Convention did not exist.”).
196 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 54, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2308, T.S. No. 539.
197 Wrathall, supra note 187, at 244.
190
191
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of cable, including an 11 kilometer segment of the SEA-ME-WE 3 cable system had been stolen. 198 Local authorities had apparently permitted fishermen to
remove old undersea cables to sell its copper, but they had helped themselves
to the newer cables. 199 This incident reportedly resulted in 82 percent of
voice/data traffic lost, Internet delays for up to three months after thefts, and
cost 5.8 million U.S. dollars to restore normal service. 200
In November 2007, there was a report of the intentional sabotage of a cable
in Bangladesh, which resulted in a total loss of communications for at least one
week causing a loss of 1.05 million U.S. dollars in revenue by the Bangladesh
Telegraph and Telephone Board. 201 In addition, there have also been reports of
cable theft in Jamaica in 2008 where Cable and Wireless Jamaica lost 1.5 million dollars, 202 and a 2010 attack by separatists against the beach manhole connection of a submarine cable system linking the Philippines with Japan. 203 In
March 2013, it was reported that 16 tons of submarine cables laid on the seabed between Bangka Island and the Riau Islands in Indonesia were stolen. 204
Perhaps more disturbingly is an incident that occurred in April 2013, when
there were interruptions on multiple undersea communications cables that link
Europe to the Middle East and Asia including I-ME-WE, TE North, EIG and
SEA-ME-WE 3. 205 While initially chalked up to dragging ship anchors, the
Egyptian coast guard caught three divers trying to cut the SEA-ME-WE-4 near
Alexandria, although the motives of such an act remain unknown. 206
As grimly observed by one commentator, if attacks on cable landing sites or
cables themselves occur:
…these cascading failures could immobilize much of the international telecommunications systems and internet for several weeks. The effect on international finance,
military logistics, medicine, commerce and agriculture in a global economy would be
profound. A degraded system of military logistics would leave troops in the field with
less support. The international flow of oil and food supplies would be impeded. Chaos
in the shipping and airline industries would result. The system that supports e-mail,
Word and Excel file transfers would be gone. Electronic funds transfers, credit card

198 See Mick Green & Douglas R. Burnett, Security of International Submarine Cable
Infrastructure: Time to Rethink?, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 557, 55961 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2008).
199 Id. at 562.
200 SECHRIST, DEEP WATER, supra note 49, at 40.
201 Id. at 38.
202 Id. at 40.
203 Douglas R. Burnett, Cable Vision, PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 2011, at 66, 69.
204 Fadli & Raras Cahyafitri, Indosat Spends Rp 10 Billion Replacing Stolen Underwater
POST
(June
29,
2013,
12:45
PM),
Cable,
JAKARTA
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/29/indosat-spends-rp-10-billion-replacingstolen-underwater-cable.html.
205 Saffo, supra note 180.
206 Id.
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transactions and international bank reconciliations would slow to a crawl. 207

B. Interference with Network Management Systems
In order to drive down costs by reducing personnel and management expenses, the cable industry has employed Network Management Systems
(NMS) to remotely connect cable systems, landing stations, spare depots and
other cable system components. 208 As one scholar observed, while
“[c]onnecting cable sites with software creates more efficiency and provides
operators greater operational awareness…it creates potential new risk, particularly to cyber attacks.” 209 The worse case scenario is if hackers hack into a
NMS, gain control of multiple cable management systems, and “attain unprecedented top-level views of multiple cable networks and data flows, discover
physical cable vulnerabilities, and disrupt and divert data traffic.” 210 An incident akin to this occurred in 2010, when the Stuxnet worm, a cyber weapon
reportedly developed to target Iran nuclear facilities, disrupted the operation of
specific plant processes that were controlled by Siemens-manufactured industrial control systems. 211
C. Gaps in the Existing Law Governing the Protection of Submarine Cables
The next question is: what role can international law play in addressing the
above-mentioned threats to submarine communications cables? There are several instruments in international law that could potentially be utilized, but the
existing legal framework is fragmented and is not capable of ensuring the security of this vital communications infrastructure.
1. The Law of the Sea
The natural starting point is the law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. As
previously discussed, in territorial waters, i.e. waters under the sovereignty of
the coastal State, coastal States have the power to adopt laws to protect submarine cables, even going as far as to regulate the innocent passage of foreign
vessels through territorial waters. 212 Further, UNCLOS recognizes the followFonow, supra note 53, at 44.
See Sechrist, New Threats, supra note 46, at 12.
209 Id. at 8.
210 Id. at 13.
211 Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks:
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 972-73 (2010).
212 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 21, ¶ 1(c).
207
208
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ing activities are “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the State”
and are thus prohibited in territorial waters: 213
Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of
the coastal State;
Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State;
Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State. 214

In the event that a vessel is found to be engaging in the above activities, passage is rendered non-innocent, and coastal States can take the necessary steps
to prevent this passage. 215 Prima facie, these provisions give coastal States the
basis to take measures to protect submarine cables from intentional damage.
However, these provisions do not oblige States to take such measures, and
many States do not have sufficient laws and regulations to protect cables from
intentional damage within territorial waters, including the most basic measure
of ensuring that damage to submarine cables is criminalized. 216
In areas outside of territorial waters, namely the EEZ and the high seas, Article 113 applies. To recapitulate, Article 113 of UNCLOS requires States to
adopt laws and regulations to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or through culpable negligence is a punishable offense. 217 While Article 113 could in principle cover intentional damage to
the cable network, it has several limitations that render it ineffective at addressing these threats. First, many States Parties to UNCLOS have not implemented
their obligation under Article 113 to extend criminal jurisdiction over acts
committed on the high seas or EEZ. 218 The States that have implemented Article 113 are usually implementing their obligations under the 1884 Cable Convention; meaning their legislation has not been updated and the penalties are

Id. art. 19, ¶ 2(c)-(d).
Id.
215 Id. art. 25, ¶ 1.
216 For example, the U.S. had at one time only imposed a maximum penalty of only
$5000 for willful injury to submarine cables. See Scott Coffen-Smout & Glen J. Herbert,
Submarine Cables: A Challenge for Ocean Management, 24 MARINE POL’Y 441, 444 (2000).
“This insignificant maximum criminal penalty provides little incentive for enforcement
authorities to assign full time legal and investigative personnel to prosecute vessel owners
caught damaging a submarine cable,” and would not even begin to cover the costs of repairs. Id.
217 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 113.
218 Tara Davenport, Research Fellow, Ctr. for Intl. Law, The Criminalization of Damage
to Submarine Cables: Problems and Prospects 5 (2010) (unpublished presentation) (on file
with the National University of Singapore Centre for International Law),
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/TaraDavenport-Criminalization-ofDamage-to-Submarine-Cables.pdf.
213
214
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consequently woefully inadequate. 219 The most common penalty in national
legislation for intentional damage to cables is a monetary penalty, 220 which is
arguably not commensurate with the damage resulting from intentional interference with cable systems.
Second, jurisdiction under Article 113 is limited to perpetrators who are nationals of that State, or if they use a vessel flying the flag of that State. 221 Given
the critical nature of submarine communications cables there is a strong argument that intentional damage is a crime that attracts universal jurisdiction and
that all States should have jurisdiction over the offender. At the very least, the
State(s) whose communications have been disrupted should have jurisdiction
to prosecute as well as the State on whose continental shelf the damaged cable
is located. 222
Third, Article 113 only obliges States to adopt laws criminalizing intentional
damage, and neither gives warships the right to board, nor arrest a vessel suspected of intentionally breaking a cable. 223 Generally speaking, due to concerns
about unnecessary interference with the freedom of navigation, the right to
board vessels in areas outside the territorial sea (i.e. EEZ/high seas) is highly
regulated under UNCLOS and is only allowed in certain instances. 224 States
have opposed a right to board without the consent of the flag states even for the
suppression of the most serious crimes. 225 However, there is some merit in the
argument that warships of all States should have the right to board vessels suspected of intentionally breaking a cable. For example, Article X of the 1884
Cable Convention allows warships to require the master of a vessel suspected
of having broken a cable to provide documentation to show the ship’s nationality and thereafter to make a report to the flag state. 226 This provides an effective
219 For example, the penalty in the United States is $5000 for willfully breaking a submarine cable. 47 U.S.C. § 21 (2012). In Australia, the fine is set at $2000 for intentional breaking. Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1963 (Cth) s 7 (Austl.). In New Zealand, the fine was set at substantially higher at $250,000. Submarine Cables and Pipelines
Protection Act 1996, s 11 (N.Z.).
220 COMMC’NS SEC, RELIABILITY, & INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL, PROTECTION OF SUBMARINE
CABLES
THROUGH
SPATIAL
SEPARATION
53
(2014),
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric4/CSRIC_IV_WG8_Report1_3Dec2014.pdf.
221 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 113; Davenport, Submarine Cables, supra note 106, at
218.
222 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 113; Davenport, Submarine Cables, supra note 106, at
220.
223 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 113.
224 Article 110 of UNCLOS provides that the right to board exists when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the ship engaged in piracy, the slave trade, engaged in unauthorized broadcasting, or that it is without nationality or flying the same flag as the boarding
war ship. See id. art. 110, ¶ 1.
225 Id. art. 110, ¶ 2.
226 1884 Cable Convention, supra note 82, art. 10.
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deterrent to prospective attacks.
Some scholars have argued that intentional damage to cables could fall within the definition of piracy under UNCLOS. 227 Article 101 defines piracy as,
“any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship, or a private
aircraft, and directed . . . on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft . . . against a ship,
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” 228
The advantage of deeming intentional damage to cables as a piratical act is that
it would be subject to universal jurisdiction and gives all warships the right to
board and arrest a suspected vessel. 229 However, it would certainly be a
strained interpretation due to the requirement under the definition of piracy that
two vessels be involved, and that it be done for private ends/commercial purposes. 230
Fourth, UNCLOS only applies to the portion of cable that is laid on the seabed and does not apply to attacks against cable landing sites. 231
2. The Law of Cyberattack
There is no accepted definition of what constitutes a “cyberattack,” and indeed this term has been used interchangeably with cyber-warfare and cybercrime. 232 The U.S. Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military Terms defines “computer network attack” (“CNA”) as “actions taken through the use of
computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks or the computers and networks themselves.” 233 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) also adopts this
227 Beckman, Critically Important, supra note 148, at 15; see generally Travers Twiss,
The International Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Address Before the Association for the Reform & Codification of the Law of Nations (Aug. 24, 1880), in REPORT OF
THE EIGHTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE HELD AT BERNE, AUGUST 24TH – 27TH, 1880, at 98, 99
(1880) (“The [U.S. Government] took the initiative by making a proposal upon this question
in the year 1869, when it expressed a desire that a diplomatic conference should meet at
Washington to consider a draft international convention; but the Franco-German war supervened and put an end to the project.”).
228 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 101.
229 Id. art. 105.
230 Wrathall, supra note 187, at 247-48.
231 See UNCLOS, supra note 85, arts. 2-16.
232 See Hathaway et al., supra note 3, at 823; but see TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 106 (Michael N. Schmitt ed. 2013) (“A
cyber-attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”).
233 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-13.1, ELECTRONIC WARFARE,
at GL-6 (2007), http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-1.pdf.
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definition but adds that “a computer network attack is a type of cyber attack.” 234 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined network warfare as:
[T]he employment of Computer Network Operations (CNO) with the intent of denying adversaries the effective use of their computers, information systems, and networks, while ensuring the effective use of our own computers, information systems,
and networks. These operations include Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer
Network Exploration (CNE) and Computer Network Defense (CND). 235

The U.S. National Research Council defines cyber-attacks as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.” 236 Some suggest an objective-based definition of cyberattack: “[a] cyber-attack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions
of a computer network for a political or national security purpose.” 237
Under any of the above definitions, an intentional attack on submarine cables laid on the seabed, on cable landing sites, and on the network management
systems that operate cable systems, would constitute a cyber-attack. 238 The next
question is whether international law applies to cyber-attacks and if it does,
does it provide an effective framework that protects the security of submarine
cables.
There has been much debate on whether and to what extent international law
applies to cyber- attacks. After all, unlike traditional battle domains:
[C]yberspace is the only domain which is entirely man-made. It is created, maintained, owned and operated collectively by public and private stakeholders across the
globe and changes constantly in response to technological innovation. Cyberspace not
being subject to geopolitical or natural boundaries, information and electronic payloads are deployed instantaneously between any point of origin and any destination
connected through the electromagnetic spectrum . . . While cyberspace is readily accessible to governments, non-state organizations, private enterprises and individuals
alike, IP spoofing and the use of botnets, for example, make it easy to disguise the
origin of an operation, thus rendering the reliable identification and attribution of
cyber activities particularly difficult. 239

This highlights one of the central difficulties in developing an adequate legal
234 N. ATL. TREATY ORG., AAP-6, NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, at 2-C12 (2008), http://fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf.
235 JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 176 (Mike Loukides ed., 1st ed. 2009) (citing
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-13, INFORMATION OPERATIONS
(2006)).
236 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
237 Hathaway et al., supra note 3, at 826.
238 Id. at 827 (“Using a regular explosive to sever the undersea network cables that carry
information packets between continents . . . is a cyber-attack.”).
239 NILS MELZER, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RES., CYBERWARFARE & INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (2011), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-andinternational-law-382.pdf.
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framework to govern a cyber-attack that has challenged international law,
namely the fact “the speed and anonymity of cyberattacks makes proving State
responsibility and ‘distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals and
nation states difficult.’” 240
Experts and scholars alike have struggled with what international law applies to cyberattacks. For example, from its inception in 2004, the United Nations’ Governmental Group of Experts (“GGE”) on Developments in the Field
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security debated over whether international law applied to the use of information and
communication technologies by States. 241 In particular, there was disagreement
on whether the laws of war, namely jus ad bellum (when it is appropriate to go
to war) and jus in bello (principles governing the way in which war is conducted) applied to cyberattacks. 242 That said, in September 2012, the U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, confidently asserted that established
principles of the international laws of war apply to cyberspace. 243 In June 2013,
the GGE stated, “[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United
Nations, is applicable, and is essential in maintaining peace and stability and
promoting an open, secure and peaceful and accessible ICT environment.” 244
While there is no doubt that certain bodies of international law can be used to
deal with cyber-attacks, it is piecemeal and fragmented, and by no means comprehensively addresses the security challenges posed by cyber-attacks. 245
In the context of intentional damage to submarine cables, cable landing sites
and interference with network management systems, which involve both physical infrastructure and virtual space, the laws of war can fill some of the gaps.
Jus ad bellum determines when the use of force is justified. 246 As a starting
point, Article 2 ¶ 4 of the U.N. Charter provides that Member States “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other man240 Shackelford & Andres, supra note 211, at 974 (quoting DAVID HELD, MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY 293-97 (2006)).
241 G.A. Res. 58/62, ¶ 4 (Dec. 18, 2003).
242 See U.N. Secretary-General, Developments In the Field of Information and Telecommunications In the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. A/66/152, at 35-37 (July 11,
2011).
243 Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the USCYBERCOM InterAgency
Legal
Conference
(Sept.
18,
2012),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm.
244 Rept. of Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, at 8, para. 19,
U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013).
245 Hathaway et al., supra note 3, at 821.
246 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ANSWERS TO
YOUR QUESTIONS 8 (2015), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0703.pdf.
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ner inconsistent with the [p]urposes of the United Nations.” 247 This is reinforced by the customary international law principle of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of States. 248 There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the
use of force. Article 39 of the Charter allows the Security Council to authorize
collective security operations in response to threats to the peace, breach of
peace or an act of aggression. 249 Article 51 provides that States have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. 250
Thus, in the event that intentional interference with submarine cable systems
amount to a “threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression,” 251 (as determined by the Security Council), the Security Council can authorize a use of force against that State. Similarly, if intentional interference
with submarine cable systems amounts to an “armed attack,” 252 a State or
States have the right of self-defense.
While this is of course important, these principles do not effectively address
the protection of this critical communications infrastructure. First, such attacks
would have to amount to a “threat to international peace and security” or an
“armed attack” before the Security Council and/or States can take action. 253
This may prove to be particularly difficult for intentional infiltration against
the network management systems of submarine cables, in which there may be
no physical manifestation. Second, it assumes that the perpetrators of such attacks are easily identifiable, and does not address intentional damage to cable
systems committed by non-State actors. Third, a State’s use of force in response to an armed attack in the form of intentional interference with cable
systems must also comply with jus ad bellum principles of necessity and proportionality under customary international law. 254 Necessity requires that force
must only be used as a last resort when diplomatic means fail and proportionality requires that responses cannot be excessive. This circumscribes the response that States can take. “[C]yber-attacks rising to the level of armed attacks may require decision-makers to devise ways of measuring harm to computer networks and its indirect effects against more conventional kinds of harm

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
See G.A. Res. 25/2625 (XXV), at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also G.A. Res. 37/10, Manila Declaration on the Public Settlement of International Disputes (Nov. 15, 1982).
249 U.N. Charter art. 39.
250 Id. arts. 40-42, 51.
251 Id. art. 39, para. 1.
252 Id. art. 51, para. 1.
253 Hathaway et al., supra note 3, at 843-48 (comprehensively discussing the difficulties
of establishing that an act is a threat to peace and security or armed attack thus warranting
the use of collective action and the right of self-defense).
254 Id. at 849.
247
248
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in order to determine what would constitute a lawful response.” 255
Apart from the laws of war, international telecommunications law may also
address cyberattacks, including intentional damage to cable systems. The ITU
is the leading U.N. agency that establishes international standards for information and communication technology. 256 The organization is primarily concerned with allocating global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, and developing technical standards to ensure that networks and technologies seamlessly
interconnect. 257 The ITU has issued some regulations and standards that could
apply to cyber-attacks which make use of electromagnetic spectrum or international telecommunications networks, but none of these directly implicate the
protection of cables systems from intentional damage. 258
3. Terrorism Conventions
There are existing counter-terrorism conventions that could apply to intentional attacking cable systems. For example, the International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings adopted in 1997 provides that it is an
offense to unlawfully and intentionally use an explosive or lethal device
against an infrastructure facility with the intent to cause extensive destruction
of such facility or where such destruction results in or likely to result in major
economic loss. 259 An “infrastructure facility” is defined as “any publicly or privately owned facility providing or distributing services for the benefit of the
public such as water, sewage, energy, fuel or communications.” 260 However,
this is restricted in its effectiveness as it would only apply to cable landing
sites destroyed as a result of bombing and not necessarily to actual cables destroyed by another method. It would also not apply to attacks on the NMS of
cable facilities.
D. The Way Forward: An International Treaty
The above discussion amply illustrates that presently that while there is a
patchwork of international laws that could theoretically address certain aspects
of the security of cable systems, there are significant gaps. Given the potential
severe ramifications of intentional damage to global economy and security, as
well as the complexity of regulating something that inherently transnational in
Id.
See About ITU, supra note 1.
257 Id.
258 Hathaway et al., supra note 3, at 866-67.
259 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 2, ¶ 1, Dec.
15, 1997, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered into force May 23, 2001).
260 Id. art. 1, ¶ 2.
255
256
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nature, international cooperation between States in the form of an international
multilateral treaty on the protection of submarine cable systems appears to be
the best way forward.
This would no doubt be a complex endeavor in view of the fact that protecting a submarine cable system involves the virtual, land, and sea domains, and
consequently, a cross-section of international and national agencies as well as a
variety of experts from different fields. However, as will be illustrated below, a
useful starting point is to use the structure of the terrorism conventions. 261
First, the international treaty should define a range of offenses which would
include intentional damage to cable landing sites, land cables and submarine
cables provided that they are part a submarine cable system. Moreover, it
should also include the offense of using malware to take control of network
management systems for the purpose of disrupting communications.
Second, the treaty should oblige State Parties to ensure that these offenses
are reflected in national legislation punishable with commensurate penalties.
Third, States Parties should also be required to establish jurisdiction over the
offenses defined in the convention when they have a link or connection to the
offense because the act took place within their territory, or was committed by
their national, or from a ship flying their flag. 262
Fourth, State Parties should also be required to establish jurisdiction over
the offense when the alleged offender is “present in their territory” and the
State chooses not to extradite them. This requires States to enact legislation
which give their courts jurisdiction to try the offender, even though the offense
was committed by a foreign national outside their territory, so long as the offender is physically present in their territory. 263
Fifth, if the alleged offender is present in their territory, State parties should
have a legal obligation to take them into custody and to ensure their presence
in their territory. The State then has only two choices: it must either extradite
the alleged offender or prosecute them. The State can extradite the alleged offender to another State party that has jurisdiction, such as the State of nationality of the offender, the State in whose territory the offense was committed, or
the State on whose ship the offense was committed. If they elect not to extradite the alleged offender, the State’s only option is to prosecute the offender in
their courts. 264
Sixth, the convention should include provisions that make it possible to extradite alleged offenders to other State parties, even in the absence of an extra261
262
263
264

Beckman, Critically Important, supra note 148, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dition treaty between the two countries. 265
Seventh, the convention should contain provisions that require State parties
to provide mutual legal assistance to assist the State where the alleged offenders are prosecuted. The legal assistance would include matters such as providing evidence or witnesses. 266
The first question is whether States have the necessary political will to negotiate such a convention. Indeed, it is surprising that such a treaty has not been
negotiated as yet given the critical importance of submarine cables and how
other conventions have been adopted for airport and maritime infrastructure. 267
There are several possible reasons for this. First, there is a lack of awareness
about the importance of cables to the international telecommunications system.
Evidence about the lack of awareness is highlighted by the common misconception that the Internet and other web-based technologies are provided by
satellite.
Second, unlike other public infrastructure that has received protection under
international treaties, the cable industry has been driven by private investment
and companies. 268 Governments have very little involvement in the construction and management of cables, and have thus always perceived cable systems
as a problem for the private sector. 269
Third, there is also no international intergovernmental organization responsible for submarine cables and thus nobody is advocating for its protection on
the international level. 270 The ITU, as mentioned above, would seem the most
relevant agency but is unaware about the marine portion of submarine cables.
The ICPC is an industry based organization representing the industry although
it recently began to admit States as members. 271
In this regard, the best forum to raise the protection of submarine cables
would appear to be the United Nations efforts to address cyber security conId.
Id.
267 See, e.g., The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 UNTS 474 (entered into force
Aug. 6, 1989).
268 Douglas R. Burnett, International Law Advisor, Int’l Cable Prot. Comm., Economic,
social, and environmental aspects of submarine cables, Presentation Before the 16th Meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the
Laws
of
the
Sea
6
(Apr.
7,
2015),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/icp16_presentations/Burnett.pdf.
269 Id.
270 DOUGLAS R. BURNETT ET AL., INT’L SEABED AUTH., ISA TECH. STUDY NO. 14, SUBMARINE CABLES AND DEEP SEABED MINING: ADVANCING COMMON INTERESTS AND ADDRESSING UNCLOS “DUE REGARD” OBLIGATIONS 17 (2015),
http://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/08/submarinecables-and-deep-seabed-mining/techstudy14_final_web.pdf.
271 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 25.
265
266
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cerns. There have been two GGEs that have examined the existing and potential threats from the cyber-sphere, first in 2004 and second in 2009. 272 The Report of the 2009/2010 recommended, amongst other things, dialogue on norms
for State use of information and communications technologies to reduce risk
and protect critical infrastructure. 273 Indeed, in its most recent Report issued in
2015, it has been reported that the GGE has adopted several norms that include
understandings that nations should not intentionally damage each other’s critical infrastructure with cyber attacks; should not target each other’s cyber
emergency responders; and should assist other nations investigating cyberattacks and cybercrimes launched from their territories. 274 While it is not clear
whether the protection of submarine cable systems has come up during discussions, it certainly provides an appropriate platform to discuss such issues.
IV. SUBMARINE CABLES: A TOOL FOR INTELLIGENCEGATHERING?
Frequently described as the second oldest profession, 275 espionage has
existed since time immemorial, leading Hugo Grotius to write in the 17th Century that “there is no doubt, but the law of nations allows anyone to send spies,
as Moses did to the land of promise, of whom Joshua was one.” 276 The concept
of peacetime espionage or intelligence gathering “encompasses a wide range of
clandestine government activities” 277 with the objective of ensuring that “as
much as possible is known in advance of any particular course of action being
taken.” 278 Arguably, intelligence gathering is one of the lesser-known uses of
the submarine cable network. 279 While the practice remains unsurprisingly
272 See U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 5,
U.N. Doc. A/60/202 (Aug. 5, 2005); see also Rep. of Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶¶ 4-11, U.N. Doc. A/65/201, (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter 2009 GGE
Rep.].
273 2009 GGE Rep., supra note 272, ¶ 18.
274 See Rep. of Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶¶ 13(d), 13(f),
13(k) , U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015).
275 For example, see Paul Reynolds, The World’s Second Oldest Profession, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2004, 5:01 PM) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3490120.stm.
276 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS 331 (1901).
277 Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L.
291, 298 (2015).
278 NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 214 (2011)
279 Khazan, supra note 13.
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shrouded in mystery, there appear to be two ways in which submarine cables
have been used for intelligence gathering purposes, first by placing a recording
device on undersea cables (hereinafter referred to as “underwater surveillance”) and the tapping of undersea cables for purposes of collecting the data
that passes through them. 280 Each will be dealt with in detail below.
A. Underwater Surveillance
A vital component of maritime security is ensuring that States have all the
available information at their disposal to take preventative or responsive action. 281 As observed by Klein:
[I]ntelligence gathering at sea has predominantly concerned the pursuit of information
that may prove useful for a state’s national security. In other words, what does a state
need to know about the maritime areas of another state, or what may otherwise be
learned about a state (including its defensive or aggressive capacity) from the water
surrounding it? This intelligence enables states to make decisions about their own national defence. 282

The United States has described intelligence gathering in ocean spaces as
Maritime Domain Awareness (“MDA”), which is “the effective understanding
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States,” 283 in order to “facilitate timely, accurate decision-making so as to enable actions that neutralize
threats to US national security interests.” 284 Maritime intelligence collection
really began to gain traction in World War II where maritime signal intelligence gathering (“SIGINT”) and maritime electronic intelligence gathering
(“ELINT”) were developed and employed. 285 Ships were increasingly seen as
“modern intelligence-gathering platforms” tasked with gathering communications and electronic intelligence. 286 There now exist a plethora of technologies
that are utilized for maritime intelligence gathering, including “radar, sonar
and laser technologies; electro-optical, oceanographic, hydrographic, acoustic,
geophysical and geospatial sensing; satellite spot-beam and microwave relay
Id.
KLEIN, supra note 278, at 212, 214.
282 Id. at 214-15.
283 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL P LAN TO ACHIEVE MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS FOR THE
STRATEGY
FOR
MARITIME
SECURITY
2
(2013),
NATIONAL
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/national_maritime_domain_awareness_
plan.pdf.
284 Id. at 10.
285 Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings Restraint: Proposing a Jus Ad Bellum Model for the
EEZ Surveillance Conundrum 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
286 Judson Knight, Ships Designed for Intelligence Collection, ENCYC. OF ESPIONAGE,
INTELLIGENCE,
&
SEC.,
http://www.faqs.org/espionage/Se-Sp/Ships-Designed-forIntelligence-Collection.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
280
281

94

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 24.1

traffic interception systems; airborne and ship-based maritime communication
surveillance, and electronic warfare (“EW”) capabilities; and more recently,
long-endurance reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (“UAVs”).” 287
Submarine coaxial cables, now just submarine cables, also provided an opportunity for maritime intelligence gathering. In the late 1950s, the Office of
Naval Research funded the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(“AT&T”) to develop an undersea surveillance system designed to detect and
track Soviet submarines. 288 By “setting up multiple listening posts – arrays of
hydrophones strung along lengths of cabling – at strategic choke points like the
GIUK gap, the U.S. Navy would be able to triangulate and track the locations
of otherwise deep-diving Soviet subs.” 289 This system was known as Sound
Surveillance System (“SOSUS”) and was viewed as “a key, long-range early
warning asset for protecting the United States against the threat of Soviet ballistic missile submarines…and also provided vital cueing information for tactical, deep-ocean anti-submarine warfare. 290 The hydrophones were connected
by cables to processing centers located on shore known as Naval Facilities. 291
At the height of the Cold War in the 1970s, the U.S. Government launched
Operation Ivy Bells, which involved deploying submarines and combat divers
to place waterproof hydrophones on the undersea cable that ran parallel to the
Kuril Islands off Russia. 292 SOSUS was eventually supplemented by surfacebased listening posts and subsequently integrated into the larger Integrated
Undersea Surveillance System (“IUSS”). 293 The Russians discovered the project in 1981 when NSA employee Ronald Pelton sold information about the
program to the KGB for $35,000. 294 They then began to develop quieter submarines and by the end of the Cold War, the ability of IUSS to detect and track
Soviet nuclear submarines had considerably diminished, 295 and the end of the

Lubin, supra note 285, at 2.
Edward C. Whitman, SOSUS, The “Secret Weapon” of Undersea Surveillance, 7
WARFARE,
no.
2,
Winter
2005,
UNDERSEA
http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_25/sosu
s.htm.
289 Andrew Tarantola, SOSUS: The US Navy’s Long-Range Undersea Ears for Spotting
Soviet Subs, GIZMODO (June 12, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://gizmodo.com/sosus-the-us-navyslong-range-undersea-ears-for-spotti-1588077646. “GIUK” is the channels between Greenland, Iceland and the UK. Whitman, supra note 288.
290 J. Ashley Roach, Military Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND POLICY 338, 340 (Douglas R. Burnett, et al. eds., 2014).
291 Whitman, supra note 288.
292 Khazan, supra note 13.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Whitman, supra note 288.
287
288
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Cold War reduced the necessity for such a system. 296 That said, it has been reported that “growing concerns of China’s rising naval power and Russia’s renewed aggression have the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) propositioning to commercial ventures and defense contractors alike for a new generation of deep water listening stations.” 297 While the
initial SOSUS used submarine cables specifically constructed for intelligence
gathering, it is not clear whether a new generation of underwater listening stations would use the existing submarine fiber optic network. The latter possibility appears to be more unlikely, given the industry’s concern with preserving
the integrity of global telecommunications. 298 Moreover, the military would
likely own and operate an underwater listening system using its own submarine
cable network, rather than commercially owned ones.
SOSUS provided the foundation for cables to be used by scientists for marine data collection. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy permitted a small
number of oceanographers to make use of the SOSUS system for research. 299
The Navy’s action fueled further research into how submarine cables could be
used for scientific purposes, and as mentioned above, submarine cables are
now used for deep-ocean monitoring. 300 This involves equipping submarine
communications with scientific sensors for climate monitoring and disaster
reduction. 301 These scientific sensors would collect key measurements relevant
to climate change and disaster detection such as temperature, pressure, salinity/conductivity, seismic, hydroacoustic, and cable voltage. 302 The scientific
sensors are placed within the repeaters found on submarine cables every 60 to
100 kilometers. 303 There are three ways in which submarine cables can be integrated into real-time global climate and disaster monitoring systems. First, by
Id.
Tarantola, supra note 289.
298 For example, the cable industry has expressed concern at scientific sensors being
placed on existing submarine fiber optic networks may undermine the reliability of the
communication network which always remains its first priority. See BURNETT, WORKSHOP
REPORT, supra note 41, at 24-26.
299 The Cold War: History of the SOund SUrveillance System (SOSUS), DISCOVERY OF
SOUND IN THE SEA, http://www.dosits.org/people/history/SOSUShistory/ (last visited Oct.
15, 2015).
300 See generally Davenport, A New Frontier, supra note 10, at 243-45.
301 See generally STEPHEN LENTZ & PETER PHIBBS, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, USING
SUBMARINE CABLES FOR CLIMATE MONITORING AND DISASTER WARNING: ENGINEERING
FEASIBILITY
STUDY
2-3
(2012),
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itut/oth/4B/04/T4B040000170001PDFE.pdf.
302 BUTLER, supra note 62, at 3.
303 BURNETT ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 41, at 24. Repeaters are used to amplify the optical signals over long distance. YUZHU YOU, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, USING
SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TO MONITOR THE CLIMATE 4 (2010),
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/23/01/T23010000110003PDFE.pdf
296
297

96

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 24.1

re-using out of service cables. 304 Second, another suggestion has been to attach
sensors and related components to in-service communications cables. 305 The
third option is the development of a new generation of multi-purpose cables. 306
This would entail redesigning the repeaters that are integrated with built-in
sensors that would enable climate monitoring and disaster detection. 307
B. UNCLOS
Before addressing the applicable provisions in UNCLOS in detail, a few salient points should be mentioned. First, except for one provision in Part II on
the territorial sea, 308 intelligence gathering is not explicitly mentioned in UNCLOS. It only occasionally came up in during the negotiations of UNCLOS as
part of a larger debate on the permissibility of military activities 309 in the
oceans and was never the object of formal negotiations 310 due to the belief of
many States, that this would rapidly derail any efforts to come to an agreement
on a convention. 311 However, the issue of military activities including intelligence gathering was always hovering in the background and shaped the way in
which many of the provisions were drafted, particularly in the EEZ. 312 After all,
the maritime powers wanted to preserve their ability to move freely around the

304 Cables usually have a life span of 20 – 25 years, and a large quantity of firstgeneration fiber optic cables were retired before the end of its lifespan due to such cables
becoming outdated in the face of new cable technology. YOU, supra note 303, at 2.
305 Yuzhu You, Multipurpose Submarine Cable Repeaters: Required to Monitor Climate
FORUM,
Nov.
2010,
at
7,
8-9,
Change,
54
SUBTEL
http://www.subtelforum.com/issues/STF_54.pdf. “Slight modification of these repeaters –
plugging in only one pressure sensor into their housing, for example – could turn the single
purpose telecommunication network into multi-purpose, real-time global tsunami and sealevel rise monitoring network.” Id.
306 BUTLER, supra note 62, at 18.
307 YOU, supra note 305, at 10.
308 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 19, ¶ 2(c) (stating that “any act aimed at collecting
information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State” is deemed prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State and renders passage noninnocent).
309 See KLEIN, supra note 278, at 43. Military activities cover a range of activities, “from
intelligence gathering, to training of forces, testing and use of vessels and equipment and
installations, to weapons tests and military engagements either short of or amounting to
armed conflict.” Id.
310 FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: REGIME AND LEGAL
NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1989).
311 See Capt. George V. Galdorisi & Comm. Alan G. Kaufman, Military Activities in the
Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 CAL. W. INT’L
L. J. 253, 272 (2002).
312 VICUNA, supra note 310, at 108-09.
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oceans and to defend national security interests. 313 Coastal States, on the other
hand, were naturally wary of the navies of third States operating in areas near
their coasts and perceived such activities as prejudicial to their national security. 314 Ultimately, the Convention is largely silent on this issue, and as will be
demonstrated below, this has resulted in a considerable amount of uncertainty
and ambiguity on whether intelligence gathering is permitted under UNCLOS.
The next three sections will discuss the UNCLOS regime on intelligence
gathering in three major maritime zones, the territorial sea, the EEZ and the
high seas, and how it relates to the construction of an underwater listening station either by laying new cables on the seabed specifically for this purpose or
by placing recording devices on an existing cable telecommunications network.
1. Territorial Seas
Within the territorial sea, the coastal state controls and authorizes the laying
of cables and any activity associated with it. 315 Further, it is very clear that any
intelligence gathering by third States is prohibited. As noted in Part II, the territorial sea is a zone in which the coastal State has sovereignty, and this is only
constrained by the coastal State’s obligation to allow foreign flagged vessels
innocent passage. 316 Passage is innocent provided it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order, or security of the coastal State. 317 Research and survey activities “are any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State,” and “any act aimed at interfering with
any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the
coastal State,” and “any activity not having a direct bearing on passage” will
render passage non-innocent. 318 Clearly, the establishment of underwater listening stations using cables would fall foul of the above prohibitions. 319
2. Exclusive Economic Zone
As mentioned above, the EEZ is neither under the sovereignty of the coastal
313 James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention: A National Security Success—Global
Strategic Mobility Through The Rule of Law, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 543, 547 (2007).
314 Id. at 554-55.
315 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 2.
316 Id. art. 17.
317 Id. art. 19, ¶ 1.
318 See id. art. 19, ¶¶ 2(c), 2(k), 2(l).
319 Although one could argue that the placement of such devices is not an interference
with any systems of communications or any other facilities or installations of the coastal
State.

98

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 24.1

State nor part of the high seas, but is a special sui generis regime 320 where the
coastal State has rights and jurisdiction over resources and certain other activities 321 to be balanced with the traditional high seas freedoms afforded to other
States. 322
There are several arguments both for and against the legality of using submarine cables for intelligence gathering, many of which are part of the larger
debate between States such as the United States and China on the legality of
military activities generally. 323 The academic discourse on the legality of military activities generally, which can be somewhat polemic, is vast and not possible to comprehensively canvas in this Article. The discussion that follows
will attempt to synthesize some of this literature and apply it to the specific
example of using cables for intelligence gathering.
The first issue that arises is whether submarine cables used for underwater
surveillance falls within one of the rights of all States recognized in the EEZ
under Article 58 (1):
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 324

All States have the right to lay cables in the EEZ. 325 In the majority of the
relevant provisions in UNCLOS, the generic phrase “submarine cable” is used
and the term is not defined anywhere in UNCLOS. It has been argued that “the
objective, purpose and interpretation of this term—”submarine cables”—and
subsequent agreements strongly suggest that the term refers to cables used to
transport voice, data and internet traffic between system end points.” 326 Thus, it
See UNCLOS, supra note 85, art 19, ¶ 2.
Id. art. 56, ¶ 1; see also discussion supra Part II(1).
322 Id. art. 58, ¶ 1.
323 See, e.g., MARK J. VALENCIA, E.-W. CTR., MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
ACTIVITIES IN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES: CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT—A SUMMARY
REPORT
OF
THE
BALI
DIALOGUE
4-10
(2002),
www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/BaliDialogue.pdf; Stuart Kaye, Freedom
of Navigation, Surveillance and Security: Legal Issues Surrounding the Collection of Intelligence from beyond the littoral, 24 AUSTR. YB. INT’L L. 93, 102-04 (2005); Raul Pedrozo,
Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities in
China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHIN. J. INT’L L. 9, 12-20 (2010); Zhang Haiwen, Is it
Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States?—
Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in the EEZ, 9 CHIN. J.
INT’L L. 31 (2010).
324 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 58, ¶ 1.
325 Id.
326 KENT BRESSIE, USING SUBMARINE CABLES FOR CLIMATE MONITORING AND DISASTER
320
321
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has been contended that the laying of hydrophone arrays in the EEZ using cables can be subsumed under the freedom to lay cables since their “key functions of transmitting electronic impulses and information to terminals or other
receivers have common elements.” 327 Roach has also argued that military cables, which are submarine cables used for military purposes or are military
owned and/or leased, are subject to the same regime under international law
that governs submarine cables. 328
It could also be argued cables used for underwater surveillance cannot be
subsumed under the freedom to lay cables because the objectives of such cables is not the transmission of data or telecommunications but rather covert
intelligence gathering. 329 Accordingly, the next question is whether it can be
considered part of “other internationally lawful use of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of… submarine cables.” 330 The answer to this hinges on whether intelligence gathering is permitted in the EEZ, an issue which is mired in controversy. 331 According to the
United States, this phrase was an implicit reference to traditional high seas
freedoms such as the freedom to conduct a large range of military activities,
including intelligence gathering activities and consequently using cables for
underwater surveillance. 332 Preserving traditional high seas freedoms of military activities in the EEZ was a high priority for the US 333 and thus U.S. Ambassador Elliot Richardson proposed the language of “internationally lawful
uses of the sea” to preserve such freedoms. 334 According to the United States,
the treaty negotiations support this interpretation. 335 The maritime powers were
willing to concede to the coastal States economic rights over a vast portion of
the oceans provided that traditional high seas freedoms such as military activiWARNING:
OPPORTUNITIES
AND
LEGAL
CHALLENGES
21
(2012),
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/4B/04/T4B040000160001PDFE.pdf.
327 Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms, 29 MARINE POL’Y 123, 129 (2005); see Elmar Rauch, Military Uses of
the Oceans, 28 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 229, 256-57 (1985); see also ROBIN R. CHURCHILL &
A.VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 427 (3rd ed., 1999).
328 Roach, supra note 290, at 339.
329 VALENCIA, supra note 322, at 4-10.
330 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 58.
331 VALENCIA, supra note 322, at 4-10.
332 Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 311, at 272.
333 For example, during the negotiations of UNCLOS, the US and other maritime powers
had objected to the suggestion that the phrase “other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to navigation and communications” because they felt it was too restrictive. See Jorge
Casteñeda, Negotiations on the Exclusive Economic Zone at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
MANFRED LACHS 621, 622 (1984).
334 Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 311, at 272.
335 Id. at 280.
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ties were preserved in this zone. 336 As the nomenclature suggests, the “concept
of an [EEZ] was not intended to reserve any rights for coastal States other than
the economic rights of the coastal State in those waters, as well as a narrow
slice of associated jurisdiction for specific purposes.” 337 Attempts during negotiations to recognize the security interests of the coastal State in the EEZ were
explicitly rejected. 338 Thus, any aerial, surface, and subsurface surveillance
activities in the EEZ is an “internationally lawful use of the sea” that has been
borne out by State practice. 339 Relative to this interpretation, the laying of cables with recording devices and the placement of recording devices on existing
cable networks are lawful intelligence gathering activities; however, there are
several counter-arguments to this, some of which raise legitimate legal arguments.
First, the plain reading of “internationally lawful uses of the sea” only recognize that all vessels, including military vessels, enjoy freedom of navigation
within the EEZ. 340 The language does not give States unrestricted rights to conduct military activities in the EEZ. 341 Further, in contrast to the position put
forth by the United States, there was not a clear and unanimous understanding
that military activities would not be prohibited in the EEZ. 342 Several States
rejected such an interpretation, even at the time of adoption of the Convention.
For example, Brazil stated on the signing of the Convention that the “provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or maneuvers, within the exclusive economic zone, particularly when
these activities involve the use of weapons or explosives. 343 Indeed, it is true
that the issue was not formally raised in negotiations and therefore, it can be
said that there was no agreement on the issue. Further, it is also argued that
Id. at 264.
Jonathan G. Odom, The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China)
Should be Concerned, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411, 438 (2010).
338 Id.
339 Raul Pedrozo, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 23, 30 (Peter Dutton ed.,
2010).
340 Haiwen, supra note 323, at 33.
341 Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 311, at 279 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 59
which requires that the maritime States conduct their operations in the EEZ with “due regard
to the rights and duties of the coastal States”).
342 Id. at 280.
343 See 2 U.N. OFF. OF LEGAL AFF., MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 212, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/19, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.5 (2001).
The declarations of Cape Verde, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Uruguay voiced similar
statements. See id. at 213, 220, 222, 225, 231. This was in turn protested by France, Italy,
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there is no consistent State practice on this issue, and indeed, several States
have adopted EEZ legislation that recognize security-related interests in the
EEZ. 344 While such legislation may be prima facie a violation of UNCLOS, it
certainly demonstrates a lack of consensus on the permissibility of intelligence
gathering in the EEZ. 345
Second, it has also been suggested by some Chinese academics that intelligence gathering activities are contrary to the obligation of reserving the EEZ
for peaceful purposes 346 and the overarching obligation in Article 301 of UNCLOS requiring all States to refrain from any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the principle of international law embodied in the UN
Charter. 347 Not all military activities/intelligence gathering activities are contrary to the peaceful purposes obligation, only those that threaten or use force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state inconsistent
with the UN Charter. 348 The question then becomes what constitutes a threat or
use of force inconsistent with the Charter. Some intelligence gathering technologies used in the EEZ are becoming “increasingly more intensive and intrusive,” 349 this includes:
[A]ctive signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities conducted from aircraft and ships,
some of which are deliberately provocative and intended to generate programmed responses. Other SIGINT activities intercept naval radar and emitters, thus enabling the
location, identification and tracking of surface ships as well as the planning and preparation of electronic missiles against them. These activities appear to involve far greater interference with the communication and defense systems of the targeted coastal
State than any traditional passive intelligence gathering activities conducted from outside national territory. 350

Notwithstanding the above, the threshold for an intelligence gathering activity reaching the threshold of a use of force or threat of use of force is high,
and underwater surveillance by cables does not meet this threshold. 351
Fourth, it has also been argued that a user State’s obligation to have due regard for the rights and duties of the coastal State, and to comply with the laws
and regulations adopted by the coastal State under Article 58 (3) of UNCLOS
is a restraint on military activities in the EEZ. 352 China, for example, has suggested that the due regard obligation requires States to refrain from any activi344 JAMES KRASKA, MARITIME POWER AND THE
TIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 276-77 (2011).
345 KLEIN, supra note 278, at 47.
346
347
348
349
350
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Id. at 126.
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ties “which endanger the sovereignty, security and national interests of the
coastal countries.” 353 Due regard has not been defined by the Convention; however, it is considered a procedural obligation which involves a balancing of the
rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State and user States in the EEZ.354
It is said to consist of two elements, an awareness of and consideration for other State’s interests and a weighing of those interests or sources of authority. 355
In the present case, the due regard obligation does not prohibit military activities, as it merely mandates that it does not interfere with the coastal State’s
economic rights over resources, and its jurisdiction over the environment, marine scientific research and installations. Moreover, from a practical perspective, it is difficult to see how the due regard obligation would be implemented
for military reconnaissance activities. For example, as has been argued elsewhere, for military activities like weapons exercises, the due regard obligation
can be implemented through a system of notification. Intelligence gathering is
inherently covert and thus a system of notifications would not work. Thus, the
due regard obligation provides a weak, if any, limit on intelligence gathering
activities.
Fifth, instead of being an “internationally lawful use of the sea associated
with the operation of ships, aircraft, and submarine cables,” 356 it has been argued that cables used for underwater surveillance fall within “artificial islands,
installations and structures” 357 under the jurisdiction of the coastal State pursuant to Article 60 of UNCLOS. Article 60 stipulates that the coastal State has
the “exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction,
operation and use of (a) artificial islands; (b) installations and structures for the
purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the
coastal State in the zone.” 358 There are several problems with this argument. A
submarine cable is not easily classified as an installation or structure. 359 Further, Article 60 also clearly sets out with some specificity the artificial islands,
installations, and structures which the coastal State has jurisdiction over those
which are used for economic purposes, marine scientific research or environmental purposes, as set out in Article 56, and those which interfere with the
rights of the coastal State in the EEZ as recognized under UNCLOS. Proposals
to give the coastal State the exclusive right to construct and regulate all artifi353
354
355
356
357
358
359
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cial islands, installations and structures for any purpose, including military
installation and devices were rejected, which suggests that the coastal State
right was intended to be circumscribed, and thus does not apply to military
installations.
3. High Seas
Customary international law has always recognized military activities including intelligence gathering has a lawful use of the high seas associated with
the operation of warships exercising the freedom of navigation. 360 The list of
high seas freedoms set forth in Article 87 of UNCLOS was not intended to be
an exhaustive list, 361 and although not explicitly mentioned in Article 87 of
UNCLOS, it is generally agreed that intelligence gathering is a high seas freedom. 362
As mentioned above, the laying of cables is also a high seas freedom, 363 and
thus, prima facie, a country’s military forces would be free to lay cables with
underwater listening stations used specifically for military purposes pursuant to
this right.
C. Tapping of Undersea Fiber Cables
Historically, the U.S. National Security Agency conducted its covert intelligence gathering activities using satellite and microwave towers but this was
considerably hindered with the increasing use of submarine cables for the
transmission of communications. 364 The pinnacle of these tapping endeavors is
certainly the discovery in 2013 that both the United States and United Kingdom national security agencies have been “tapping directly into the Internet’s
backbone,” 365 namely the fiber optic cables. According to newspapers reports,
the existence of these programs was disclosed by the NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden as part of his efforts to expose “the largest programme of suspicionless surveillance in human history.” 366 The UK’s fiber tapping program
known as Tempora was able to collect around 21 million gigabytes per day,
including “recordings of phone calls, the content of e-mail messages, entries on
Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 311, at 272.
KLEIN, supra note 278, at 45. Article 87 uses the terminology inter alia. UNCLOS,
supra note 85, art. 87.
362 Hayashi, supra note 327, at 130.
363 UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 87, ¶ 1(c).
364 US Spy Agency Labors to Preserve Hearing in Tech Age, 9 SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC
COMMC’NS SYS. NEWSL., No. 8, Aug. 2001, at 6-7 [hereinafter SFOCS Newsletter].
365 Khazan, supra note 13.
366 MacAskill et al., GCHQ, supra note 14.
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Facebook and the history of any internet user’s access to websites- all of which
is deemed legal, even though the warrant system was supposed to limit interception to a specified range of targets.” 367 Hundreds of analysts from both the
GCHQ and NSA sifted through the data that was obtained from more than 200
fiber optic cables. 368 This has been described as “upstream collection,” which
involves the accessing of communications of fiber cables and infrastructure as
data flows past. 369 The data “provides a powerful tool in the hands of the security agencies enabling them to sift for evidence of serious crime…it has allowed them to discover new techniques used by terrorists to avoid security
checks[,]…identify terrorists planning atrocities[, and]…used against child
exploitation networks and in the field of cyberdefence.” 370
At least seven telecommunications companies have been allegedly complicit
in this project. 371 Indeed, it has been alleged that some companies have been
paid for the cost of their cooperation and/or were obliged to co-operate as a
condition of their licensing. 372 How these agencies might tap an underwater
cable is not entirely clear as the process is extremely secretive. One report has
stated that intercept probes are attached to transatlantic fiber-optic cables
where they land at cable landing stations located on British shores. 373
Other reports speculate that it is done by directly tapping undersea cables
that are laid on the seabed. In the mid-1990s, it was reported that the NSA installed a tap onto an undersea cable by using a special submarine to splice into
the cable, although details are vague. 374 Similarly, in 2005, it was reported that
the submarine USS Jimmy Carter was equipped with the ability to tap undersea
cables and eavesdrop on the communications passing through them. 375 Such an
operation involves the submarine lifting the cable from the seabed and onto the
submarine into a special chamber where crew would extract data either by
bending the fiber or by splicing a second fiber to each of the fibers. 376 According to one article “the easiest place to get into the cables is at the regeneration
Id.
Id.
369 Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Cables, WASH. POST (July 10,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-haventseen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html.
370 MacAskill et al., GCHQ, supra note 14.
371 Pratap Chatterjee, Glimmerglass Intercepts Undersea Cable Traffic for Spy Agencies,
CORPWATCH (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15862.
372 MacAskill et al., GCHQ, supra note 14.
373 Khazan, supra note 13.
374 SFOCS Newsletter, supra note 364, at 7.
375 New Nuclear Sub is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability, N. Y. TIMES (Feb.
20, 2005) [hereinafter Nuclear Sub], http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/20/politics/newnuclear-sub-is-said-to-have-special-eavesdropping-ability.html?_r=1.
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points—spots where their signals are amplified and pushed forward on their
long circuitous journeys.” 377 Such physical tapping is necessary when cablelanding stations are on foreign soil and are otherwise inaccessible. 378 However,
in 2001 cable experts expressed doubt that physical tapping could occur, considering that splicing a fiber could result in an interruption in communications
which could be detected by the cable operator. 379
At this point, it is appropriate to highlight the distinction in objectives between cables used for the Sound Surveillance System described above, and the
tapping of cables. The former is done in order to enhance awareness about the
environment in which navies operate, including gathering information on the
military capabilities of the Soviet Union. 380 The latter is a form of mass surveillance or bulk electronic surveillance that has been described as the “clandestine
surveillance by one state during peacetime of the communications of another’s
state’s officials or citizens when those communications take place partly or
entirely outside the surveilling state’s territory.” 381
Whether UNCLOS can be used to address the mass surveillance carried out
through the tapping of undersea cables is not entirely clear. To the extent that
UNCLOS governs intelligence gathering activities, it could be argued that it
only applies to intelligence gathering activities that take place within the maritime domain, and will not govern the use of intercepts at cable landing stations.
Further, if indeed mass surveillance can be done by physically tapping undersea cables by splicing the cable or otherwise, it is also not certain that UNCLOS is the applicable regime to govern such acts. Such surveillance does not
fall within conventional perceptions of military activities/intelligence gathering
at sea, which as mentioned above, is targeted, and aims at enhancing
knowledge of the marine environment and/or the military capabilities of other
State’s navies. That said, UNCLOS is of course a living instrument and subject
to evolutionary interpretation, and for present purposes, this Article will assume that UNCLOS applies to the mass surveillance carried out by tapping
undersea cables to the extent it involves physically tapping cables as they lay
on the seabed.
Within the territorial sea, as was the case for cables used for underwater surveillance discussed above, the physical tapping of submarine cables will certainly be deemed as an “act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of
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the defence or security of the coastal State,” 382 or an “act aimed at interfering
with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of
the coastal State,” 383 and will thus render passage non-innocent. 384
Within the EEZ, the discussion above on the controversy surrounding the
legality of intelligence gathering activities would also apply—the bottom line
is that there is no clear prohibition against the physical tapping of fiber optic
cables in the EEZ to be found in UNCLOS. However, if the physical tapping
of fiber optic cables results in the interruption or obstruction of telecommunications, then Article 113 may come into play. Article 113 obliges State Parties
to ensure that there is adequate national legislation penalizing the willful or
negligent breakage or injury to a submarine cable that results in obstruction or
interruption of telecommunications. In particular, if physical tapping involves
splicing a cable which does cause a disruption of communications, this would
be a breach of Article 113. 385 That said, Article 113 may not be particularly
useful, considering that many States have not implemented their obligation
under Article 113 to adopt national legislation. Further, physical taps may also
be hard to detect although they reportedly can cause a slow-down in communications. In the high seas, intelligence gathering is a freedom of the high seas;
however, if physical tapping results in breakage/injury to the cable so as to
disrupt telecommunications, Article 113 applies.
D. The Way Forward
The legal regime established in UNCLOS has significant gaps in relation to
intelligence gathering in maritime areas. This is arguably unsurprising given
that “traditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime
practice of espionage.” 386 As observed by Chesterman:
Despite its relative importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few
treaties that deal with it directly. Academic literature typically omits the subject entirely, or includes a paragraph or two defining espionage and describing the unhappy
fate of captured spies. For the most part, only special regimes such as the laws of war
UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 19, ¶ 1(c).
Id. art. 19, ¶ 1(k).
384 See id. art. 19, ¶ 2.
385 This may not be particularly useful, considering that most States have not implemented their obligation under Article 113 to adopt national legislation. See discussion supra Part
III; see also UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 113.
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address intelligence explicitly. Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently in the
legal regimes dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control. 387

Deeks postulates that there are three approaches to international law’s regulation of intelligence gathering. 388 The first approach contends that because
there is nothing in international law that prohibits espionage, it is permitted
under international law. 389 The second approach argues that “international law
should be read affirmatively to permit spying” as it is inherent in a State’s right
to act in self-defense and/or it has been affirmed by widespread state practice. 390 The third approach proposes that international law does regulate intelligence gathering, drawing from three sources of law, namely the law on sovereignty and territorial integrity, human rights law such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, although “those sources lack crisp content or have not been consistently read by states to inhibit foreign surveillance.” 391 The lack of clarity on
when and the extent to which international law applies to espionage has meant
that domestic law governs much espionage activity. 392
It is beyond the scope of this Article to put forth comprehensive solutions to
the legal issues related to intelligence gathering in the oceans. 393 Nonetheless, a
few salient points are worth mentioning. While it is possible that States will
negotiate a treaty to regulate intelligence gathering in general, it is arguably a
far-off possibility given the wide divergence of opinions on its legality. 394 Other scholars have put forth suggestions on what an international legal framework could look like and these provide extremely useful foundations for a dialogue on this issue. Regardless of whether international law can provide a solution, a wider question needs to be asked—should submarine cables be used for
intelligence gathering activities at all? The mass surveillance done by physically tapping cables underwater (to the extent that it is done) would appear to run
the risk of damaging the cable and thus putting the submarine cable network in
jeopardy. While there is less of a chance of cables being damaged when they
are used for acoustic surveillance underwater, such uses of submarine cables
387 Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In From the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1072 (2006).
388 See Deeks, supra note 277, at 301-13.
389 Duncan B. Hollis, Is Law Losing Cyberspace?, OPINIO JURIS (June 4, 2015, 10:48
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/06/04/is-law-losing-cyberspace.
390 Deeks, supra note 277, at 302.
391 Id. at 304.
392 Yoo, supra note 386, at 24.
393 Lubin, for example, suggests that the jus ad bellum principles of just cause, necessity,
immediacy and proportionality should be applied to intelligence gathering activities. See
Lubin, supra note 285, at 56-62. Deeks suggests that domestic law is a profitable source of
ideas for international law on surveillance. See Deeks, supra note 277, at 343-61.
394 Deeks, supra note 277, at 342.
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increases the suspicion and mistrust on the part of States to cable laying activity. Coastal States are increasingly imposing regulations on cable laying and
repair in the EEZ undermining its status as one of the freedoms recognized
there. 395 While this is unsurprising given that coastal States view the EEZ in
quasi-territorial terms and wish to control all activities which take place there,
the perception cables can be used for such military purposes arguably increases
the chances of all cable activities being unduly restricted. This, in turn, could
impact the connectivity that we so depend on today. Thus, governments and
the cable industry must carry out a careful cost/benefit ratio when making decisions on whether to use submarine cables for intelligence gathering. After all,
submarine cables are the backbone of the Internet and using them for this purpose implicates the security of global telecommunications.
V. CONCLUSION
The international community’s reliance on submarine fiber optic cables cannot be underestimated. From the Internet to phone and bank services to science
and military uses, it is not an exaggeration to say that the submarine fiber optic
cable has become the foundation of our modern digital society, and one of the
most important drivers in globalization. The focus of this Article has been on
the importance of submarine cables to security in general and to cybersecurity
in particular. Despite this criticality, the emphasis in discussions about cyber
security has been hitherto directed at the protection of information, and not
about the protection of the submarine cables that transmit this information. As
discussed above, submarine cables are vulnerable to two distinct challenges—
intentional interference with submarine cable systems by State and/or nonState actors, as well as tools for intelligence gathering. The legal regime for the
protection of cables from both these threats consists of a patchwork of international conventions and customary international law and significant gaps remain. While intentional interference and intelligence gathering are qualitatively different requiring different responses, it is undeniable that the international
community must begin to, at the very least, start a dialogue about these issues.
With regard to the protection of cable systems from intentional interference
by State and/or non-State actors, this Article demonstrated that the present legal regime is deficient in ensuring the security of cables. UNCLOS, the laws of
war and terrorism conventions are capable of addressing certain aspects of the
protection of cables, but surely critical communications infrastructure such as
cables deserves a more comprehensive and holistic legal regime. To this end,
395 For a more comprehensive discussion on the regulation of cable laying in the EEZ by
coastal States, see Ford-Ramsden & Davenport, supra note 104, 140-52.
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the Article proposed the adoption of an international treaty that protects submarine cables, making intentional interference (be it a physical or cyberattack)
with submarine cable systems an international crime, and including provisions
for mutual cooperation on enforcement against such crimes. While there is always a certain amount of inertia when negotiating an international instrument,
the cable industry and the ICPC should work together with national governments to include this issue in current discussions at the UN about cybersecurity. Framing it as a cybersecurity issue is likely to get the most traction.
With regard to using submarine fiber optic cables for intelligence gathering,
this raises a whole set of different issues. Using cables for intelligence gathering does not necessarily result in damage to the cables—although in some cases it might. Further, the practice is shrouded in mystery, particularly using cables to conduct mass or bulk surveillance. As with the protection of submarine
cables from intentional interference, the legal regime is patchy and piecemeal,
perhaps because intelligence gathering general subsists in the shadows of the
law. In the context of ensuring the security of submarine communications, the
question must be asked whether submarine cables should even be used for intelligence gathering purposes given how vital they have become to the world.
While this issue is unlikely to ever be a subject of an international treaty, it is
imperative that governments and the cable industry alike must carry out a careful cost/benefit ratio when making decisions on whether to use submarine cables for intelligence gathering. In the author’s view, the risk to the submarine
cable system may outweigh the benefits of using them for intelligence gathering.

